University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2010

Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries
Jill E. Fisch
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Law, Public
Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, Finance and Financial
Management Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Sales and Merchandising Commons, and the
Securities Law Commons

Repository Citation
Fisch, Jill E., "Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries" (2010). Faculty Scholarship at Penn
Law. 306.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/306

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

FISCH FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/24/2010 12:01 PM

ARTICLE

RETHINKING THE REGULATION OF SECURITIES
INTERMEDIARIES

†

JILL E. FISCH

This Article argues that existing regulation of mutual funds has serious
shortcomings. In particular, the Investment Company Act, which is based primarily on principles of corporate governance and fiduciary duties, fails to support—and in some cases impedes—market forces. Existing evidence suggests
that retail investing behavior and the dominance of sales agents with competing financial incentives further weaken market discipline.
As a solution, this Article proposes that funds should be treated primarily
as financial products, rather than corporations; correspondingly, investors
should be treated primarily as consumers, rather than corporate shareholders.
To implement this approach, the Article proposes the creation of a new federal
agency that would develop standardized financial products coupled with corresponding disclosure principles. Sellers of retail financial products would be
required either to conform their products to these standards or to explain material differences. The goal is to enhance market discipline while making retail
funds less complicated and more understandable for individual investors.

†

Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Prior
drafts of this Article were presented at the Vanderbilt Law & Business Program Seminar Series, the Illinois Program in Law and Business Policy, and the Eleventh Annual
Vanderbilt Law & Business Conference. I am grateful for the helpful comments I received at each. Special thanks to Eric Roiter and Todd Henderson for their thorough
and thoughtful suggestions. Vijit Chahar, University of Pennsylvania Law School LLM
Class of 2010, provided valuable research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the capital markets, following a series of corporate
governance scandals, has led to a variety of proposals for regulatory
1
reform. Largely absent from the public debate, however, is a response to the changing role and dramatically increased importance of
2
intermediaries to the securities markets. The ownership of public
1

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/
FinalReport_web.pdf (detailing President Obama’s proposal for financial regulatory
reform); Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Financial Services Committee Approves Legislation to Regulate Derivatives (Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://
www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs_dem/pressder_101509.shtml
(describing
legislation that would establish comprehensive regulation of over-the-counter derivatives).
2
The Treasury Department released proposed legislation on July 10, 2009, the
Investor Protection Act of 2009, which addresses, among other things, mutual fund
sales practices and broker conflicts of interest. See Investor Protection Act of 2009,
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/tg205071009.pdf; cf. Investor
Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing the Treasury Department’s draft legislation in the House of Representatives). Some of the Treasury
Department’s proposals are included in the mammoth Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 approved by the House of Representatives on December
11, 2009. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009) (containing over 1000 pages of proposed
reforms to financial regulation). The extent to which final legislation will address these
issues remains unclear.
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equity has shifted substantially from retail to institutional investors
since Congress enacted the federal securities laws in the 1930s. As of
the end of the third quarter of 2009, institutional investors held ap3
proximately fifty percent of total U.S. corporate equities, while retail
4
investors (“the household sector”) held thirty-eight percent. This
trend is exacerbated for the largest companies; as of the end of 2007,
institutional investors owned an unprecedented 76.4% of the largest
5
1000 corporations. Although the market collapse reduced these figures, as of the end of 2006, institutional investors still controlled assets
6
totaling $27.1 trillion, a ten-fold increase from 1980.
Many institutional investors are intermediaries in that they invest a
pool of capital contributed by other investors, most frequently retail
7
investors. The mutual fund is the dominant form of intermediated
8
investment. At the end of 2008, even after much of the market col9
lapse, equity mutual funds held over $3.7 trillion in assets, ninety-two
10
percent of which were contributed by the household sector. In addition to mutual funds, retail money is invested through other intermediaries including exchange-traded funds (ETFs), pension funds, and
3

BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS THIRD QUARTER 2009, at 92 tbl.L.213
(2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1.pdf (after
June 10, 2010, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20100311). Institutional investors included in the Federal Reserve’s data include banks, savings institutions,
insurance companies, private pension funds, government retirement funds, mutual
funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, and brokers and dealers.
4
Id.
5
CONFERENCE BD., THE 2008 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT 26 tbl.18
(2008). The report defines institutional investors as pension funds, investment companies, insurance companies, banks, and foundations. Id. at 10 tbl.2.
6
Id.
7
See, e.g., Brian Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, The Future of Securities Regulation, Address Before the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law & Economics (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ile/webcasts.
html#content (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/
spch102407bgc.htm) (explaining that retail stock “ownership now is increasingly intermediated by mutual funds and other collective vehicles”).
8
At the end of 2008, there were almost 9000 mutual funds in the United States.
INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 15 fig.1.9 (49th ed. 2009),
available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf. “Investment companies as a whole were the largest group of investors in U.S. companies, holding 27 percent of their outstanding stock at year-end 2008.” Id. at 11.
9
The dollar value invested in mutual funds (including equity funds, bond funds,
hybrids, and money markets) peaked at approximately $12 trillion at the end of 2007.
Id. at 164 tbl.55. Equity funds alone accounted for approximately $6.5 trillion of that
amount. Id.
10
Id.
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money market funds. Although institutions own most U.S. equity, the
number of households that are exposed to the capital markets has increased dramatically, fueled in part by growth in various forms of retirement savings, which account for a substantial portion of household
11
investment. Tax advantages and changes in pension regulation have
increasingly thrust individual investors into mutual funds and other
12
intermediated investments.
A growing percentage of ordinary citizens are invested in the capital markets through intermediaries, and those investments represent
an increasing percentage of their wealth. Small investors who participate in the markets through mutual funds, money market funds, and
retirement accounts may be financially unsophisticated and of limited
means. At the same time, the number and complexity of intermediated products continue to increase, creating growing challenges for
retail investors.
The financial crisis highlighted these concerns. Many individual
13
investors suffered dramatic losses, requiring them to make sacrifices
14
such as deferring retirement or taking second jobs. Many of those
who lost money did so because they were invested in unsuitable products, because they did not fully appreciate the risks associated with their
investments, or because they received inadequate financial advice.
Going forward, policymakers must target consumer protection with re15
spect to these investments as a distinct regulatory objective.
11

According to the Investment Company Institute, “Americans held $13.4 trillion
in retirement assets at the end of the first quarter of 2009, accounting for 33 percent of
all household financial assets in the United States . . . .” Press Release, Investment
Company Institute, Retirement Assets Total $13.4 Trillion in First Quarter (Aug. 10,
2009), available at http://ici.org/pressroom/news/09_news_q1_ret_assets.
12
See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1428 (2002) (explaining how the shift from “defined contribution” to “defined benefit” pension plans fueled growth in mutual fund investment).
13
See, e.g., Sam Mamudi, Wealth Creators vs. Wealth Destroyers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,
2010, at C15 (reporting results of a Morningstar study showing that mutual fund giants
Janus Capital, Putnum, AllianceBernstein, and Invesco Aim each posted billion-dollar
negative returns to investors from 2000 to 2009 on an asset-weighted basis).
14
See, e.g., Adam Shell, Stock Losses Take a Personal Toll, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2009,
at 1B, available at 2009 WLNR 5513140 (recounting stories of “pain and dashed
dreams” among retail investors).
15
Intermediation raises a distinct set of concerns with respect to the objectives of
securities intermediaries as capital market participants. In particular, intermediaries
may employ investment and governance strategies that reduce capital market discipline. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from
Control, 33 U. SEATTLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 6-8, on file with author) (describing examples in which intermediary objectives may not be consistent
with maximization of firm value).
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Both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Congress have directed reform efforts to retail investment products, but
these reforms have been slow, piecemeal, and often delayed reactions
16
to pervasive problems. More problematically, the reforms have not
altered the fundamental regulatory approach adopted by the Invest17
ment Company Act of 1940 (ICA), which relies on corporate governance, fiduciary principles, and a disclosure approach modeled upon
the regulation of investments in operating companies. This Article
argues that the ICA approach is conceptually flawed. Governance
mechanisms applicable to operating companies do not translate well
to intermediated financial products. Empirical research suggests that
capital market discipline does not adequately constrain the sponsors
of these products and that the structure of these products and the
manner in which they are sold precludes the operation of traditional
market forces. As Judge Posner, long a champion of market discipline, recently observed, “The governance structure that enables mu18
tual fund advisers to charge exorbitant fees is industry-wide . . . .”
Fees, moreover, are only part of the story—the evidence suggests that
many intermediated investments are confusing, misleading, and excessively risky, and that existing regulation creates incentives for the
creation of products that are deliberately complex.
16

For example, regulators have long been concerned about sales agent conflicts
of interest. In 2004, the SEC proposed rules that would have required brokers to provide customers with targeted information at the point of sale regarding conflicts of interest. Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements for
Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, Securities Act Release No.
8358, Exchange Act Release No. 49,148, Investment Company Act No. 26,341, 69 Fed.
Reg. 6438 (proposed Feb. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 274).
After receiving input from investors and industry groups, the SEC revised its proposals
and reopened the comment period for the proposal in 2005. Point of Sale Disclosure
Requirements and Confirmation Requirements for Transactions in Mutual Funds, College Savings Plans, and Certain Other Securities, Securities Act Release No. 8544, Exchange Act Release No. 51,274, Investment Company Act No. 26,778, 70 Fed. Reg.
10,521 (proposed Mar. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 274). In
2008, then–SEC Chairman Christopher Cox indicated an intention to revisit point-ofsale disclosure. Judith Burns & Kara Scannell, Cox May Revise Rules in His SEC Swan
Song, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2008, at C2. To date, the proposal has remained dormant.
Point-of-sale disclosure is one of the components of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, but as it is currently proposed, the Act would require the
SEC to conduct a study of retail investors and products prior to adopting any such
rules. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7104 (2009).
17
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006).
18
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc), denying reh’g to 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated
No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08586.pdf.
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This Article offers a bold alternative: rejecting the ICA framework—including its corporate governance requirements and reliance
on fiduciary principles—in favor of an integrated product-based ap19
proach: “conform or explain.” Conform or explain would require a
new regulatory agency, the Consumer Investment Regulatory Authority (CIRA), to promulgate specifications for standardized or plainvanilla versions of the most common intermediated investment products. CIRA’s standards would include benchmarks, as well as information about risk, asset allocation, product characteristics, investor suitability, and cost.
Unsophisticated investors or those who want to minimize their research costs could purchase compliant products with the knowledge
that these products conform to industry norms. In other words, investors would know that the product had the specified characteristics and
that its fees, risk, etc., were within a standard range. Firms would be
free to market other products, but would be required to disclose the
manner in which their products differ from the standard, including
differences in investment strategies, fees, and fee structures. CIRA
would also oversee the sales practices used to market nonconforming
products and would be free to impose additional regulation on selling
agencies, such as disclosure of conflicts of interest. By retaining the
freedom for firms to develop new financial products while better tailoring disclosure, this model would increase consumer protection
without sacrificing innovation. More importantly, by providing meaningful transparency to often opaque and complex products, conform
or explain would enhance market discipline while retaining the range
of investment choices available for sophisticated investors.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the
existing regulatory structure applicable to mutual funds and related
intermediated investments—money market funds, ETFs, and 401(k)
plans. Part II considers the effectiveness of market discipline and of-

19

Although the terminology “conform or explain” superficially resembles the
“comply or explain” approach introduced by the Cadbury Commission and subsequently incorporated into U.K. corporate law, the U.K. approach is based on the premise that the objective is full compliance with the designated standards. See, e.g., THE
COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 54 (1992), available at
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf (“The boards of all listed companies registered in the UK should comply with the Code of Best Practice . . . . As
many other companies as possible should aim at meeting its requirements.”). In contrast, this Article envisions a scenario in which the regulatory standard is a benchmark,
rather than a norm.
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fers some reasons why market forces may not effectively constrain
fund companies. Part III identifies critical weaknesses in existing investment company regulation, focusing on the regulation of corporate
governance and disclosure. In Part IV, the Article introduces its proposal—product regulation under a conform-or-explain model administered by CIRA—and demonstrates why this approach is superior to
the alternatives.
I. REGULATION OF RETAIL INVESTOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES
A. Mutual Funds
20

A mutual fund is a pooled investment vehicle, regulated by the
21
SEC pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA). Mutual
funds are typically organized as corporations or business trusts under
22
state law. The ICA requires a mutual fund, whether or not it is organized as a corporation, to have a board of directors or trustees elected
by the shareholders and consisting of at least forty percent independent
23
directors. Certain SEC exemptive rules extend the ICA’s independence requirement; to qualify for these exemptions, fund boards must
24
have a majority of independent directors. The board is responsible
20

The SEC explains that “[a] mutual fund is a company that pools money from
many investors and invests the money in stocks, bonds, short-term money-market instruments, or other securities.” SEC, Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
mutfund.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
21
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64. In addition to mutual funds, the ICA regulates other
types of pooled investment vehicles. The term “investment company” includes closedend funds and unit-investment trusts. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (defining “investment company”). The details of mutual fund regulation under the ICA are extensive. Additional
components not detailed in this Article include regulation of mutual fund investments,
conflicts of interest, pricing requirements, and standardized terms for redeemability, as
well as relatively new requirements that mutual funds disclose their voting in portfolio
companies. For a more comprehensive discussion of mutual fund regulation, see TAMAR
FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION (3d ed. 2005).
22
The ICA permits a mutual fund to be organized as “a corporation, a partnership,
an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, a fund, or any organized group of persons
whether incorporated or not . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8). As Philip Newman explains,
prior to 1988, some mutual funds were organized as limited partnerships, but changes to
tax law eliminated the practicality of that business structure. Philip H. Newman, Legal
Considerations in Forming a Mutual Fund, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, July 16-18, 2008, at 7,
9, available at WL SP019 ALI-ABA 7. Today most mutual funds are organized as Massachusetts business trusts, Delaware statutory trusts, or Maryland corporations. Id.
23
15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a).
24
See Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7932, Exchange Act Release No. 43,786, Investment Company Act Release
No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734, 3736 ( Jan. 16, 2001) (codified as amended at scattered
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25

for approving the fund’s contract with its investment advisor, pricing
26
the fund’s assets, and overseeing compliance with the fund’s invest27
ment policies. The ICA also vests shareholders with the right to vote
28
on alterations to the advisory contract (such as fee increases) and cer29
tain changes to the fund’s investment objectives or policies.
The mutual fund is a distinct legal entity that holds title to the
fund’s assets, but the fund itself is simply a pool of liquid assets with
no independent operations or employees. Mutual funds are typically
managed externally. An investment advisor makes the fund’s investment and trading decisions pursuant to an advisory contract. The
mutual fund procures other services, such as custodian services and
recordkeeping, through third party contracts.
The SEC has sought to protect the relatively unsophisticated investors who purchase mutual funds through variations on its traditional disclosure-based approach. Mutual funds are required to regis30
ter with the SEC and provide disclosure to investors akin to that
provided by public companies, both at the time of an initial sale and
31
on a periodic basis.
Although these rules have undergone frequent modifications, the
basic structure requires that investors receive disclosure at the time of
purchase through a statutory prospectus. Under rules adopted in
2009, the information that the SEC views as most important must be
included in a “summary prospectus,” which appears at the front of the
32
mutual fund prospectus. This information, which must be disclosed
parts of 17 C.F.R.) (requiring, among other things, that fund boards have a majority of
independent directors for the funds to qualify for certain exemptive rules). In 2004,
the SEC amended its rules to require funds relying on these exemptions to have
boards with at least seventy-five percent independent directors. Investment Company
Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378,
46,381, 46,389 (Sept. 7, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270). The Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit invalidated this rule in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC,
412 F.3d 133, 144- 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
25
15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c).
26
17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2009).
27
See Inv. Co. Inst., Overview of Mutual Fund Governance, http://www.ici.org/
idc/policy/overview_fund_gov_idc (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“In fulfilling their oversight responsibilities, directors seek to ensure that the adviser is managing the fund in
a manner consistent with the fund’s stated investment objectives.”).
28
15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a).
29
Id. § 80a-13(a).
30
Id. § 80a-7(a), a-8.
31
Id. § 80a-29(a)–(b) (requiring periodic disclosure).
32
See Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered
Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8998, In-
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in a standardized order and form, includes “(1) [i]nvestment objectives; (2) costs; (3) principal investment strategies, risks, and performance; (4) investment advisers and portfolio managers; (5) brief purchase and sale and tax information; and (6) financial intermediary
33
compensation.” The rules permit a mutual fund to satisfy the prospectus-delivery requirement with a summary prospectus as long as it
34
posts the full statutory prospectus on its website. The SEC appears to
believe that the summary prospectus, which it expects to consist of
three to four pages, will provide investors with sufficient information
35
to make an informed investment decision.
The full statutory prospectus contains more detailed disclosure
about the items in the summary prospectus, financial highlights, and
36
additional information about the portfolio manager. The prospectus
is supplemented by a third document, the Statement of Additional Information (SAI), which contains, according to the SEC, information
that “is not necessarily needed by investors to make an informed in37
vestment decision, but that some investors find useful.” Among the
categories of information contained in the SAI, but not the prospectus,
are information about the compensation of the portfolio manager, information about service providers, certain fund investment policies
(such as a fund’s derivative policy), and the brokerage commissions

vestment Company Act Release No. 28,584, 74 Fed. Reg. 4546, 4549 ( Jan. 26, 2009) (to
be codified at scattered parts of 17 C.F.R) [hereinafter Summary Prospectus Rule]
(stating that the summary prospectus contains “key information that is important to an
informed investment decision”). The SEC adopted the current rule in response to
complaints that mutual fund prospectuses were too long and difficult for investors to
use. See id. at 4547. Discussing the revised disclosure requirements, the director of the
SEC’s Division of Investment Management stated that “[m]any investors often find
current fund prospectuses to be lengthy, legalistic and confusing. This mutual fund
disclosure framework will provide information that is easier to use and more readily
accessible, while retaining the comprehensive quality of the mutual fund information
available today.” Press Release, SEC, SEC Improves Disclosure for Mutual Fund Investors (Nov. 19, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-275.htm.
33
Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 32, at 4552.
34
Id. at 4559-60.
35
Id. at 4549.
36
See id. at 4552-58 (describing additional prospectus requirements).
37
SEC, Information Available to Investment Company Shareholders, http://
www.sec.gov/answers/mfinfo.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“The SAI generally includes the fund’s financial statements and information (or additional information)
about: the history of the fund; some fund policies (such as on borrowing and concentration policies); officers, directors and persons who control the fund; investment advisory and other services; brokerage commissions; tax matters; and performance measures, such as, average annual total return.”).
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38

paid by the fund. Funds are not required to deliver the statutory
prospectus or SAI to investors, but these documents must be available
upon request and without charge. New rules require that funds post
these documents on the Internet and use available technology to make
39
the documents user-friendly.
Like public operating companies, mutual funds are also subject to
periodic disclosure requirements. Mutual funds must file a form N-Q
40
with the SEC on a quarterly basis and must provide annual and se41
miannual reports to shareholders. Shareholder reports must include
significant portfolio holdings, fund financial statements with an explanation of relevant accounting treatments, and detailed perfor42
mance information. Funds are also required to include a management discussion of fund performance (MDFP), which is analogous to
the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) required in the an43
nual report of a public operating company. As the SEC explains, the
MDFP requires the fund “to provide substantive discussion of the factors that affected the fund’s performance during the reporting pe44
riod.” Finally, funds must disclose the manner in which they have
voted their portfolio securities on Form N-PX, which they file annually
45
with the SEC.
The ICA also imposes substantive regulation on mutual funds.
46
Funds are restricted in their use of leverage. This limitation extends
38

Id.
See Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 32, at 4566-69 (describing technology
requirements, including that fund filings contain hyperlinks to enable investors to
move easily between documents).
40
See Form N-Q, 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.332, 274.130 (2009) (providing the form investment companies use to file schedules of portfolio holdings for first and third quarters).
41
See Form N-CSR, 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.331, 274.128 (providing the form investment
companies use to file certified semiannual shareholder reports).
42
See, e.g., Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8393, Exchange Act
Release No. 49,333, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,372, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,244,
11,248 (Mar. 9, 2004) (codified as amended in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.) (adopting
a requirement that funds disclose a summary portfolio schedule to shareholders and
provide a complete portfolio schedule, free of charge, upon request).
43
Id. at 11,254. The fund’s principal executive and financial officers must certify
the MDFP, pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Rule 30a-2. Id.
44
Id.
45
See 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (“Every registered management investment company . . . shall file an annual report . . . containing the registrant’s proxy voting record for
the most recent twelve-month period . . . .”); see also Form N-PX, 17 C.F.R. § 274.129
(providing the form for funds to disclose their proxy voting record).
46
See Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, Investment Company Act
of 1940: Regulatory Gap Between Paradigm and Reality?, Address at the American Bar
39
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47

to short selling, which the SEC views as borrowing. Funds are limited
to holding a maximum of fifteen percent of their portfolios in illiquid
48
assets and are also regulated in their use of options and other deriva49
tive products.
Funds must disclose their use of these investment
techniques—both in their names and in the descriptions of their investment policies—and must “cover [their] position[s] with segre50
gated assets or an offsetting hedge.”
Investment companies typically compensate their advisors with a
percentage of assets under management. An asset-based fee structure
may include breakpoints, in which the percentage paid decreases at
51
specified fund asset levels. Although funds may compensate their
advisors based on performance, the ICA prohibits the general use of
52
incentive fee structures. Rather, the only type of performance fee
Association Spring Meeting (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2009/spch041709ajd.htm (describing the ICA requirement that mutual funds
maintain an asset coverage ratio of 300%). The ICA explicitly limits the ability of a mutual fund to issue senior securities. 15 U.S.C. 80a-18(f)(1) (2006). The SEC has consistently interpreted borrowing as analogous to issuing senior securities, in violation of Section 18. See, e.g., Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 10,666, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,128, 25,129 (Apr. 27, 1979)
(“Section 18(f)(1) . . . by implication . . . treats all borrowings as senior securities.”).
47
See, e.g., Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, Remarks Before the
4th Annual Hedge Funds and Alternative Investments Conference (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch052307ajd.htm (explaining that mutual fund regulatory limits allow “funds to leverage up to one-third the value of their assets and to engage in short sales as high as 50% of assets”). These limitations led to the
creation of so-called 130/30 funds, which use a long/short trading strategy while conforming to the limitation on leverage by selling short $30 worth of assets for every $130
invested long. See, e.g., David Blitz, 130/30 Investing: Just Another Hype or Here to Stay?
2 (May 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1132940 (explaining the development and use of 130/30 funds).
48
Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, Securities Act Release No. 6927, Investment Company Act Release No. 18,612, 57 Fed. Reg. 9828, 9828 (Mar. 20, 1992).
49
See Donohue, supra note 46 (identifying provisions regulating the use of derivatives).
50
Id.
51
Breakpoint fees are designed to enable the mutual fund to capture some of the
economies of scale associated with providing advisory services to a larger fund. On a percentage basis, a large fund should be cheaper to operate than a small fund, and a breakpoint fee requires the advisor to share some of these savings with the fund. See SEC,
Breakpoints, http://www.sec.gov/answers/breakpt.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (explaining breakpoint fees).
52
The prohibition is contained in section 205 of the Investment Advisors Act,
which regulates the compensation of an advisor to an investment company. See 15
U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2006) (prohibiting the use of “compensation to the investment
adviser on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the
funds”); see generally Factors to be Considered in Connection with Investment Company
Advisory Contracts Containing Incentive Arrangements, Investment Company Act Release No. 7113, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 315, 37 Fed. Reg. 7690 (Apr. 6,
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53

permitted is a “fulcrum” fee. A fulcrum fee is based on the fund’s
performance relative to a designated index and is adjusted depending
54
upon whether the fund outperforms or underperforms the index.
Critically, the fulcrum fee must be symmetrical—the downward adjustment for underperformance must be the same as the upward ad55
justment for outperformance.
Policymakers have long expressed concern about the potential for
excessive mutual fund fees and the inability of market forces to constrain those fees adequately. In 1966, the SEC submitted a report to
Congress identifying excessive costs to mutual fund investors as a criti56
cal issue requiring Congress’s attention.
In particular, the SEC
noted that “neither competition nor the ‘few elementary safeguards’
against conflict of interest deemed sufficient in 1940 and contained in
the Investment Company Act, presently provide” adequate protection
against “excessive costs in the acquisition and management of [mutual
57
fund] investments.” The SEC noted a particular problem with respect to small investments by “family men of moderate income,” who
were charged front-end loads of as much as fifty percent of their first
58
year’s investment.
Congress responded to these concerns with the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, amending the ICA to strengthen fee59
related disclosure and oversight of fees by the board of directors.
60
Congress required that forty percent of directors be independent
and that those directors act independently to evaluate and approve
61
the fund’s contract with its investment advisor. Congress also im1972) (describing the regulation and the assessment of an appropriate fulcrum fee).
An exemption is available to mutual funds that limit their investors to “qualified
clients.” 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a) (2009). Qualified clients include natural persons
with a net worth of more than $1.5 million. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(1)(ii)(A) (2009).
53
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2) (permitting a contract that “provides for compensation based on the asset value of the company or fund under management averaged
over a specified period and increasing and decreasing proportionately with the investment performance of the company or fund over a specified period in relation to
the investment record of an appropriate index of securities prices”).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
SEC Submits Report to Congress on Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 4766 (Dec. 2, 1966), available at 1966 SEC LEXIS 377.
57
Id. at *4.
58
Id. at *5-6.
59
Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
60
15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006).
61
Id. § 80a–15(c).
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posed, in section 36(b) of the ICA, a fiduciary duty upon investment
62
advisors in connection with their compensation.
The SEC, in turn, has engaged in a variety of rulemaking and administrative decisions addressing fee disclosure and regulation of fee
types, including loads and 12b-1 fees, as well as regulation of fund ad63
vertising. The SEC describes its goal as “eliminating impediments to
vigorous price competition, increasing investor understanding of total
investment costs, promoting cost comparability among funds, and easing restrictions so that funds may experiment with distribution ar64
rangements that make costs more explicit.” Today, mutual funds must
65
disclose all fees borne by investors in a standardized tabular format.
Despite these actions, critics continue to attack mutual fund fees
as excessive. Advisory fees—the fees funds pay to their investment advisors—have received particular criticism. The SEC observed that between 1959 and 1966, fund shareholders brought over fifty lawsuits
against their mutual fund advisors challenging the size of the advisory
66
fees paid. Fee litigation has continued to the present day.
On March 30, 2010, the Supreme Court announced the appropriate test for evaluating investor claims of excessive advisory fees under
67
section 36(b) of the ICA. Most lower courts interpreting section
36(b) had applied the test, articulated in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch As62

Section 36(b) provides, in pertinent part, the following:

For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the
receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid
by such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof, to
such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser.
Id. § 80a-35(b).
63
See DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 293-98 (1992) (describing various SEC initiatives to
regulate mutual fund fees).
64
Id. at 297. Fee disclosure remains imperfect, however. See infra Section III.B.
(discussing the limited transparency associated with fee disclosure).
65
See, e.g., SEC Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8393, Exchange
Act Release No. 49,333, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,372, 69 Fed. Reg.
11,244, 11,246-48 (Mar. 9, 2004) (codified as amended at scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.)
(updating and standardizing fee disclosure requirements); SEC, Invest Wisely: Mutual
Funds, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (describing shareholder fees and SEC disclosure rules).
66
SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R.
Rep. No. 89-2337, at 83 (1966), as reprinted in FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 21, at 213.
67
Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010), http://
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-586.pdf.
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set Management, Inc., that for an advisory fee to violate the statute, “the
adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large
that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and
68
could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” Gartenberg was premised on the concern that competition among fund ad69
visors may be “virtually non-existent.”
The Seventh Circuit rejected this analysis in favor of a market70
oriented view. The court reasoned that because advisory fees are a
substantial component of a mutual fund’s overall expenses, and because expenses, in turn, substantially affect mutual fund returns, competition over mutual fund purchases should constrain advisory fees, so
long as the mutual fund industry is competitive—despite the “inces71
tuous[]” relationship between a fund and its advisor.
Dissenting from the Seventh Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc,
Judge Posner questioned the extent to which market forces in the mu72
tual fund industry can be trusted to produce reasonable fees. Citing
recent criticisms of the market for executive compensation, Judge
Posner observed that market competition may not solve the problem
of excessive fees if all mutual funds operate subject to the same system
73
of incentives. In essence, absent adequate competition, high fees will
74
not “drive investors away.”
The Supreme Court did not fully resolve this disagreement, premising its adoption of the Gartenberg test on the text of the ICA and its view
that Gartenberg “has provided a workable standard for nearly three dec75
ades.” The Court explicitly noted that the debate in the Seventh Circuit over the adequacy of the mutual fund market in constraining advi-

68

694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Jones slip op. at 7 (describing the Gartenberg standard as reflecting “something of a consensus”).
69
Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929.
70
See Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that Gartenberg “relies too little on markets”), reh’g denied, 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008), and vacated, No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010).
71
See Jones, 527 F.3d at 631, 634-35 (“[I]nvestors can and do protect their interests
by shopping, and . . . regulating advisory fees through litigation is unlikely to do more
good than harm.”).
72
See Jones, 537 F.3d at 730-32 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
73
Id. at 730-31 (noting that “fund directors and advisory firms that manage the
funds hire each other preferentially based on past interactions,” exacerbating agency
problems (quoting Camela M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2185, 2185 (2009))).
74
Id. at 731.
75
Jones, No. 08-586, slip op. at 17.
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sory fees was “a matter for Congress and not the courts.” Part II below
considers the questions Jones left unresolved about the operation of the
mutual fund market and the effect of that market on advisory fees.
B. Money Market Funds
Technically, money market funds are a subset of mutual funds.
Unlike most mutual funds, however, money market funds are managed in an effort to maintain a stable one-dollar share price. In essence, they seek to provide (but not guarantee) that investors will not
lose money on their investment. Money market funds are specially
regulated by the SEC. SEC Rule 2a-7 specifically allows money market
funds to use the amortized cost method of valuation, which enables
them to sell and redeem shares at one dollar rather than, like other
77
mutual funds, at net asset value (NAV). Rule 2a-7 attempts to address the safety of money market fund investments by requiring that
money market funds invest in safe, diversified, and liquid securities,
such as high-quality commercial paper, repurchase agreements, and
78
certain short-term bonds.
Investors commonly use money market funds as an alternative to
bank accounts; they provide near-immediate liquidity, as well as services like check-writing and ATM access. As such, money market
funds are extremely popular. According to the SEC, as of June 2009,
750 money market funds, holding $3.8 trillion in assets collectively,
were registered with the SEC, and money market funds “account for
79
approximately 39 percent of all investment company assets.”
Money market funds have traditionally competed with each other—and with traditional bank accounts—on the basis of yield. As with
most investments, higher yield is typically associated with greater risk.
Investors may or may not recognize that a money market fund is
76

Id.
17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2009).
78
Id.; see also Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 698-700 (1999) (describing
the SEC’s adoption of 1991 amendments to Rule 2a-7 in response to commercial paper
defaults).
79
Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,807, 74
Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,689 (proposed July 8, 2009) [hereinafter Proposed Money Market
Fund Reform]. As of February 2010, these numbers had decreased. See Money Market
Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,132, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060,
10,060 (Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Final Money Market Fund Reform] (“Money market funds have over $3.3 trillion dollars in assets under management, and comprise
over 30 percent of the assets of registered investment companies.”).
77
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riskier than a traditional bank account because the one-dollar-pershare net asset value is not assured and the account is not backed by
federal deposit insurance. It is difficult for investors to evaluate the risk
associated with a particular money market fund even if they are aware
of it. A fund’s risk is based on the quality of its fixed income holdings,
and that quality is not particularly transparent to fund investors. In addition, because of the short-term nature of a money market fund’s holdings, a fund’s risk profile can change rapidly. Under the SEC’s re80
quired quarterly disclosure of mutual fund portfolio holdings,
disclosure to the public of such a change could be substantially delayed.
The risk associated with money market funds gained visibility in
September 2008 when the $66 billion Reserve Primary Fund announced that it was “breaking the buck” and reducing its share price
81
to ninety-seven cents. Commentators subsequently observed that the
Reserve Primary Fund’s situation was predictable: the Fund had invested in a host of risky assets that offered higher yields and, as a result, paid as much as 4.04%, compared to the average 2.75% money
82
market yield as reported by Morningstar. Specifically, the Reserve
Primary Fund was forced to write off $785 million of Lehman Brothers
83
debt when Lehman declared bankruptcy.
The Reserve Primary Fund was only the second fund to break the
84
buck in history. Nonetheless, its announcement, coupled with the
stock market decline and other components of the financial crisis,
85
generated a widespread fear of investor panic. To allay this fear, the
federal government announced a temporary guarantee of money
80

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See Final Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 79, at 10,061 (describing the
announcement made by the Reserve Primary Fund).
82
Matthew Schifrin & Joshua Lipton, Hell Bent Innovator, FORBES.COM, Sept. 22, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/22/reserve-primary-bent-pf-ii-in_ms_0922money_inl.
html.
83
Christopher Condon, Reserve Primary Money Fund Falls Below $1 a Share (Update4),
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=a5O2y1go1GRU.
84
See id. (“The only other money-market fund to break the buck was the $82.2 million Community Bankers Mutual Fund in Denver, which liquidated in 1994 because of
investments in interest-rate derivatives.”).
85
See Final Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 79, at 10,061 (“During the
week of September 15, 2008, investors withdrew approximately $300 billion from taxable prime money market funds, or 14 percent of the assets held in those funds.”); Kara
Scannell & Eleanor Laise, SEC Commissioners Talk Money Funds, WALL ST. J., June 25,
2009, at C9 (“[I]nvestors suddenly started pulling cash out of the $3.7 trillion moneymarket fund industry, causing damaging knock-on effects in a range of other financial
markets.”).
81
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market fund assets. The government guarantee averted a run on
money market funds.
In February 2010, the SEC adopted rules to increase the safety and
87
liquidity of money market funds. The rules tightened the risk-limiting
88
conditions of Rule 2a-7. The changes included an increase in the required quality of the securities in which money market funds may invest, a reduction in the maximum weighted-average maturity of those
securities from ninety to sixty days, and a variety of liquidity requirements aimed at ensuring that funds have sufficient liquidity to handle
89
heavy redemption demands. The rules enhanced investors’ ability to
monitor fund risk by increasing the frequency with which funds report
90
their portfolio holdings from quarterly to monthly. The SEC also
floated a proposal that money market funds trade at floating net asset
91
values rather than the stable one dollar per share; this proposal did
92
not receive widespread support and has not been adopted to date.

86

See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty
Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/ hp1147.htm (“For the next year, the U.S. Treasury will insure the holdings of
any publicly offered eligible money market mutual fund . . . that pays a fee to participate in the program.”).
87
See Final Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 79, at 10,062 (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274) (explaining that the adopted rules limit risks by requiring maintenance of liquidity buffers and provide the SEC with stronger oversight power).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 10,062-80.
90
See id. at 10,081 (explaining a new requirement that funds disclose portfolio
holdings on their websites on a monthly basis); id. at 10,082 (requiring that funds
make more detailed disclosures, on a monthly basis, to the SEC).
91
See Proposed Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 79, at 32,716 -18 (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274) (requesting comment on amending money market
fund regulation to require a floating net asset value).
92
See Final Money Market Reform, supra note 79, at 10,062 (describing the proposal
and indicating that SEC staff continues to explore this and other regulatory changes); see
also Memorandum from Jennifer B. McHugh, Senior Advisor to the Chairman, SEC, to
File No. S7-11-09 (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1109/s71109-163.pdf (describing the meeting between SEC officials and representatives of
the Investment Company Institute and indicating the ICI’s “lack of support for [the] idea
of floating net asset values for money market funds”). The SEC adopted a rule requiring
funds to report market-based value to the SEC and to the fund’s board, but in response
to concerns raised by commentators, provided that public availability of this “shadow
NAV” would be delayed for sixty days after the end of the reporting period. Final Money
Market Reform, supra note 79, at 10,083; see also id. at 10,061 (“One of the most important [procedural requirements] is the requirement that the fund periodically ‘shadow
price’ the amortized cost net asset value of the fund’s portfolio against the mark-tomarket net asset value of the portfolio.”).
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Fund expenses strongly affect money market fund yields and the
93
expense ratios for money market funds are relatively high. These
costs may be a function of transaction-related expenses, such as checkwriting and ATM access. In addition, money market funds may face
high costs because of the limited supply of securities in which they
may invest, a supply that will become more limited as a result of the
amendments to rule 2a-7.
These high expenses are, at the moment, coupled with a limited
ability to generate returns due to low interest rates. Many money
market funds responded to the financial crisis by temporarily waiving
94
some or all of their fees in an attempt to maintain attractive returns.
More recently, however, most money market funds have paid little or
95
no return to investors. It is not clear, under current interest rates,
whether the business model of the money market fund is sustainable,
in part because their expenses are high relative to current interest
rates and in part because the flight to safety has restricted the range of
96
instruments in which they can invest. With the huge importance of
money market funds as an investment vehicle, maintaining such funds
is critically important. Regulatory interventions designed to reduce
fund risk may interfere with their economic viability.
C. Exchange-Traded Funds
Exchange-traded funds, or ETFs, are closely related to mutual
97
funds. ETFs have been generally marketed since the mid-1990s. Originally, ETFs were limited to tracking a specific index, much like an in93

See, e.g., Leslie Scism, How Well Do You Know . . . Money-Market Funds?, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 3, 2008, at R3 (reporting that in 2008, “the average of all money-market funds
[was] 0.58% of assets, [although] the average for the 25 largest [funds was] 0.24%”).
94
See Joan Goldwasser, Money-Market Funds Waive Fees to Boost Yields, WASH. POST,
Feb. 22, 2009, at F3 (“Some 60 percent of money-market funds already waive a portion
of their fees; others may follow.”); Chuck Jaffe, Money Fund Yields So Low That Banks Are
Better Idea, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 10, 2010, at 23 (reporting that Charles Schwab “is losing over $100 million per quarter in revenues because it is waiving fees so that its money funds stay positive”); Laura Bruce, Look Beyond Yield when Buying Money Market Funds,
BANKRATE.COM, June 3, 2003, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/money_market/
20030603a1.asp (observing that many money market funds have high expense ratios
and funds are subsidizing some expenses to maintain positive yields).
95
See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 94 (reporting that Vanguard was paying .01 percent on
one of its money market funds).
96
See id. (predicting that fund companies would exit the market if yields did not increase).
97
See Exchange-Traded Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8902, Investment Company Act Release No. 28193, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,618, 14,619 (proposed Mar. 18, 2008).
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dexed mutual fund, but they have subsequently expanded to include a
99
variety of short, leveraged, and actively managed investment options.
An ETF is typically organized as an open-end fund or unit invest100
ment trust.
Like mutual funds, ETFs hold a pool of securities that
conforms to the terms of the ETF’s prospectus. The pool is assembled by the ETF sponsor from creation units—packets of stock that
can range from 10,000 to 600,000 shares (although, according to the
101
The
SEC, most creation units consist of 50,000 or more shares).
ETF shares are then sold and subsequently traded on the secondary
market. ETFs offer stock-like trading rather than mutual fund–type
redemptions; investors are able to trade and price their investment on
an intra-day basis and can use limit orders and options.
Unit investment trusts and open-end funds are both regulated as
investment companies, but ETFs differ from traditional mutual funds
102
in several ways.
The most important difference is that ETF shares
are not redeemable at NAV except in creation units through in-kind
103
Ordinary ETF shares trade at negotiated prices in the
exchanges.
secondary market. These features, among others, require new ETFs
104
to obtain exemptive orders from the SEC in order to operate. Existing exemptive orders have been based on a variety of conditions, including disclosure by the ETF of its holdings on a daily basis (either
on its website or through the publicly available website of an index

98

See Actively Managed Exchange-Traded Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,258, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,614, 57,615 (proposed Nov. 15, 2001) (“A fundamental characteristic of all existing ETFs traded in the United States is that they are based
on specific domestic and foreign market indices.”).
99
See id. (requesting public comment on the authorization of actively traded ETFs).
100
Id. at 57,614. But see Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,623 (explaining that the SEC has not received an exemptive application for an ETF organized as a
unit investment trust since 2002).
101
Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,649 n.316.
102
See, e.g., In re iShares Trust, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,111, 75
SEC Docket 1464 (Aug. 15, 2001) (granting exemptions from various provisions of the
ICA to authorize an ETF sponsor, among other things, “to issue shares of limited redeemability [and] permit secondary market transactions in the shares of the portfolios
at negotiated prices on the national securities exchange”).
103
See Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,624 (“The principal distinguishing feature of open-end funds is that they offer for sale redeemable securities.”).
104
See id. at 14,624-27 (describing SEC conditions). The SEC’s practice, since
2000, has been to authorize sponsors to create new ETFs without further exemptive
relief, so long as the ETFs meet the terms and conditions of the original exemptions.
See, e.g., In re Barclays Global Fund Advisors, Investment Company Act Release No.
24,451, 72 SEC Docket 1082 (May 12, 2000) (describing conditions and permitting
creation of additional compliant ETFs).
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provider), listing the ETF on a national securities exchange, and regu105
lar dissemination, by those exchanges, of the ETF’s intra-day value.
The SEC has also exempted broker-dealers from the prospectus deli106
very requirement for most secondary market transactions in ETFs.
In 2008, the SEC proposed ICA Rule 6c-11, which would codify the
exemption for ETFs that meet the foregoing conditions, eliminating
107
the need for sponsors to obtain individual exemptions. To date, the
SEC has not adopted that rule.
The inability of investors to redeem ETF shares at NAV means that,
in theory, ETF shares can trade at a premium or discount to NAV, like
108
closed-end mutual funds. The potential for such a gap is reduced by
the fact that financial institutions can purchase and sell creation units at
each day’s NAV. The transparency of the ETF’s portfolio facilitates
these transactions by enabling investors to identify any difference between market price and NAV. The resulting arbitrage opportunity
109
causes the ETF’s market price to remain at or close to NAV.
Traditional indexed ETFs have competed successfully with indexed
mutual funds. Like mutual funds, ETFs offer investors easy diversification and transparency. In many cases, ETFs offer lower expenses,
110
greater trading convenience, and tax advantages. The ETF structure
proved particularly advantageous during the market volatility of the
last several years because the absence of redemption rights means that
ETF returns are not reduced by net outflows during a market down-

105

See Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,624-27 (identifying these conditions as requirements of prior exemptive orders).
106
Id. at 14,630. In the 2009 amendments to the ICA, the SEC adopted specific disclosure requirements for an ETF prospectus, including an explanation that investors may
pay brokerage commissions that are not reflected in the ETF’s reported expenses, as well
as information regarding the creation units. Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 32, at
4558.
107
Id. at 14,621 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 270, 274).
108
The SEC recently adopted a requirement that an ETF prospectus disclose the
number of trading days during the most recent year and quarters when the ETF’s trading
price was greater or less than the ETF’s NAV. See Summary Prospectus Release, supra
note 32, at 4559.
109
Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,620. But see Sam Mamudi, Bond
ETF Buyers Must Stay on Guard for Hidden Risks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2010, at C7 (reporting that prices in non–Treasury bond ETFs are deviating significantly from NAV).
110
Significantly, however, ETFs raise similar issues to mutual funds in that their
fees vary to a degree that produces material differences in performance, even between
comparable passively managed products. See, e.g., John Jannarone, Getting a Fair Share
from ETFs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2010, at C10 (identifying differences in ETF fees as well
as the allocation of stock-lending fees).
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turn—outflows that may require mutual fund managers to sell low
111
(and correspondingly, during market increases, buy high).
These advantages and the growing popularity of ETFs led fund
112
sponsors to introduce actively managed ETFs.
The SEC approved
exemptive orders permitting the sale of the first actively managed
113
Actively managed ETFs offer additional regulatory
ETFs in 2008.
challenges. First, because an actively managed ETF does not track an
index, it is more difficult to maintain transparency of the ETF’s portfolio. Reduced transparency makes it harder for financial institutions
to arbitrage actively managed ETFs. As a result, the price of ETF
shares may diverge substantially from NAV. Alternatively, mandating
comparable transparency to that required of index ETFs may allow
other market participants to identify and copy an ETF’s investment
strategy. Although the SEC’s most recent release contemplates applying its general exemptive rules to actively managed ETFs, the rules
114
would apply only to those ETFs that are fully transparent.
Beyond the introduction of actively managed ETFs, the variety of
investment strategies employed by ETFs has proliferated. A substantial number of ETFs currently use sampling and derivatives transactions to duplicate the returns associated with a particular index, rather

111

See REFLOW, HOW SHAREHOLDER FLOW DAMAGES FUND PERFORMANCE (2009),
available at http://www.reflow.com/flowdamages.htm (describing how shareholder
inflows and outflows can damage mutual fund performance).
112
See Scott Burns, Actively Managed ETFs Are (Finally) Here, MORNINGSTAR, Jan. 15,
2009, http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=271218 (describing the
introduction of actively managed ETFs as a response to “investor demands for transparency, liquidity, and tax efficiency”).
113
See In re Barclays Global Fund Advisors iShares Trust, Investment Company Act
Release No. 28,173 (Feb. 27, 2008) (granting an actively managed ETF’s requested
exemption); Barclays Global Fund Advisors, et al.; Notice of Application, Investment
Company Act Release No. 28,146, 73 Fed. Reg. 7771 (Feb. 11, 2008) (providing notice
of the requested exemptions); SEC Approves Actively Managed Exchange Traded Funds,
STAY CURRENT (Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, Los Angeles, CA), Feb. 2008, at
1, available at www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/855.pdf?wt.mc_ID=855.pdf
(reporting the SEC’s issuance of public notices indicating its imminent decision to
grant applications from several actively managed ETFs). The SEC had long been considering allowing actively managed ETFs but had noted several distinctive concerns.
See Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,621-23 (describing the SEC’s promulgation of its 2001 Concept Release, Actively Managed Exchange-Traded Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,258, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,614 (proposed Nov. 15,
2001), and comments submitted in response to that release).
114
See Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,620 (noting the benefits of ETF
transparency in facilitating arbitrage).

FISCH FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1982

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

7/24/2010 12:01 PM

[Vol. 158: 1961
115

than actually purchasing the securities that constitute the index.
ETFs use borrowing and derivatives to offer leveraged and inverse
products—using debt to multiply market-based returns and using de116
rivatives to create synthetic short positions. Unlike traditional ETFs,
117
nontraditional ETFs typically reset daily. Because of their extensive
use of derivatives, ETFs’ returns over time may differ from the performance of the underlying securities or index in ways that are diffi118
As a result, the Financial Industry
cult for investors to evaluate.
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) recently warned brokers that “inverse
and leveraged ETFs typically are not suitable for retail investors who
plan to hold them for longer than one trading session, particularly in
119
volatile markets.”
Finally, since 2003, investors have been able to purchase commodi120
ty ETFs as well as equity and bond ETFs.
ETFs that invest in commodities or currency are not regulated as investment companies.
Commodity ETFs allow investors to invest in foreign currencies, commodity indexes and specific sectors. These ETFs greatly expand the
investment and diversification options available to retail investors.
Many commodity ETFs, however, are artificially constructed through
derivative products, which can cause their returns to vary substantially
121
from the price of the underlying commodities.

115

See, e.g., Guillermo Cano et. al, ETFs, Swaps, and Futures: Trade at Index Close
(TIC) and the Coevolution of Financial Markets, 2009 INST. INV. J. (EIGHTH ANN. GUIDE TO
EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS & INDEXING INNOVATIONS), Fall 2009, at 50, 50-51 (describing the use of swaps and futures by ETFs and explaining how the use of swaps can
create tracking error and lead to counterparty risk).
116
See, e.g., Jonathan Spicer, Short ETFs Under Microscope as SEC Pounces, REUTERS,
Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53D7GU20090414 (“Leveraged
inverse ETFs are considered ‘synthetic’ because they use a formula of options and other
derivatives to yield two or even three times the profit when the underlying assets fall.”).
117
See FINRA Reminds Firms of Sales Practice Obligations Relating to Leveraged and Inverse
Exchange-Traded Funds, Reg. Notice 09-31 (FINRA, Washington, D.C.), June 2009, at 2,
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/
notices/p118952.pdf (describing daily reset and accompanying compounding).
118
See id. (providing examples).
119
Id. at 3.
120
Commodity ETFs are regulated by the Commodity Futures and Trading Commission (CFTC), not the SEC, and have recently been the focus of increased regulatory
attention. See, e.g., Brian Baskin, Small Investors Face Big Hit in ETF Push, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 22, 2009, at B1 (describing the growth and regulation of commodity ETFs).
121
See, e.g., John Jannarone, Exchange-Traded Funds Miss Oil Gusher, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 16, 2009, at C16 (explaining that, because they purchase derivatives, oil ETFs
have underperformed the market even though spot oil prices rose by 54%).
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D. 401(k) Plans
Retirement accounts reflect an ever-increasing percentage of investment funds, particularly investments by retail investors. Several
factors account for this growth, including the tax advantages of certain types of retirement accounts, the move from defined benefit
122
pension plans to defined contribution plans, increases in life expectancy and improvements in the health of retirees that make retirement savings more important, and the decreasing ability of government and employer-provided retirement payments—including social
security—to meet the needs of retirees. Although retirement accounts may be invested directly or through one or more of the intermediaries described above, the retirement account creates an additional layer of intermediation and agency costs. The remainder of this
Section highlights the particular issues raised by 401(k) plans.
Employer-sponsored 401(k) plans are employee-directed defined
contribution retirement plans. Pursuant to section 401(k) of the In123
ternal Revenue Code (for which they are named), 401(k) plans’ tax
treatment enables employees to defer recognition, and consequently
taxation, of a portion of their income until retirement. Employers also receive favorable tax treatment for their matching contributions.
The amount of assets invested in 401(k) accounts grew from $385 bil124
lion in 1990 to approximately $2.4 trillion at the end of 2008. These
plans account for approximately seventeen percent of the U.S. re125
tirement plan market.
The applicable tax laws establish the rules governing 401(k) plans
in the first instance. The Internal Revenue Code limits the total dol126
lar amount of contributions that is exempt from current taxation,
precludes plans from discriminating in favor of highly compensated
127
employees, and specifies the terms and conditions upon which
128
funds may be withdrawn from a plan.
122

See, e.g., Paul J. Donahue, Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of Options in
Participant-Directed Defined Contribution Plans and the Choice Between Stable Value and Money
Market, 39 AKRON L. REV. 9, 11 (2006) (describing the shift in popularity from defined
benefit plans to defined contribution plans).
123
I.R.C. § 401(k)(2006).
124
Inv. Co. Inst., Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plans, http://
www.ici.org/faqs/faqs_401k (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). The total value of assets invested
in 401(k) plans exceeded $3 trillion before the financial crisis of 2008. Id.
125
Id.
126
I.R.C. § 402(g)(1).
127
Id. § 401(k)(3), (12).
128
Id. § 401(k)(13)(D)(iii).
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Because 401(k) plans are an employee benefit, the Benefits Security Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor regulates their
operation, pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
129
of 1976 (ERISA). Under ERISA, an employer offering a 401(k) plan
130
owes fiduciary duties to plan participants. These fiduciary duties require that the employer use plan assets for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to plan participants and paying the associated costs
of the plan. As with mutual funds, the largest component of plan fees
is the cost of investment management services. The Department of
Labor has explained that plan “fiduciaries have a responsibility to ensure that the services provided to their plan are necessary and that the
131
ERISA also requires that plan
cost of those services is reasonable.”
132
assets be segregated and held in trust.
Importantly, however, an employer’s fiduciary duties under ERISA
are limited. Section 404(c) of ERISA exempts employers from liability
for investment losses when plan participants control the investment of
133
their contributions. To qualify for the 404(c) exemption, employers
must offer their employees a range of diversified investment options
134
and must make certain required disclosures. To the extent that the
investment options include mutual funds, the requirements incorporate the disclosure mandated by the SEC under the ICA. For example,
when the SEC adopted the summary prospectus option, the Department of Labor issued a bulletin indicating that a summary prospectus
135
would satisfy the disclosure requirements of section 404(c).
Employers typically outsource the operation of their 401(k) plans
to a plan provider or trustee that selects, in the first instance, the investment alternatives available to employees and oversees the administration of the plan, including record keeping, deposits, investor rela136
tions, and so forth. The provider’s selection of investment options is
129

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006).
See Donahue, supra note 122, at 12-19 (explaining that a sponsor’s fiduciary duty under ERISA extends “to the selection of investment options for Participant-directed
DC Plans”).
131
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, UNDERSTANDING RETIREMENT PLAN FEES AND EXPENSES 1
(May 2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/undrstndgrtrmnt.pdf.
132
29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)–(b).
133
Id. § 1104(c).
134
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2009).
135
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN 2009- 03, DELIVERY OF A
SUMMARY PROSPECTUS IN AN ERISA §404(C) PLAN (2009), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab2009-3.html.
136
See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing
Fidelity Trust’s responsibilities as Trustee for 401(k) plans offered by Deere & Company).
130
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subject to the employer’s approval. Depending on the size of the employer, the employer’s fiduciary obligations may be vested in a retire137
ment plan committee or board.
Existing law imposes relatively limited obligations on the employer
and the plan provider. Neither is required to offer a specific menu or
number of investment options beyond the minimal requirement in
section 404(c) of ERISA that plans offer at least three diversified investment options with “materially different risk and return characteris138
tics.” In fact, 401(k) plans typically offer an average of seventeen in139
vestment choices.
This average has increased over the past several
140
141
years, but the number can vary tremendously. At the end of 2008,
nearly half of 401(k) assets were invested in mutual funds, primarily
142
Many 401(k) plans also offer guaranteed instock mutual funds.
vestment contracts, company stock, or direct brokerage accounts as
143
investment options.
Existing law does not require an employer or plan provider to
maximize return or minimize fees in selecting investment options.
Legislation pending in Congress would impose more extensive obligations by requiring plan providers to disclose to employers both the to144
tal amount of plan fees and the breakdown of those fees by category.
The proposal would also require disclosure of fee information to plan
145
participants. The Department of Labor has issued proposed regula137

See, e.g., Complaint at 18-19, Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-3109 (W.D.
Mo.) (Mar. 27, 2008) (describing the Wal-Mart Retirement Plans Committee as the
named fiduciary for the 401(k) plan).
138
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B).
139
See The Economics of Providing 401(k) Plans: Services, Fees, and Expenses, 2008, RES.
FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2009, at 17 n.10 [hereinafter
Economics of 401(k)], available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/fm-v18n6.pdf (citing survey
results reporting averages ranging from twelve to eighteen investment options).
140
See 401(k) Plans: A 25-Year Retrospective, RES. PERSP. (Inv. Co. Inst., Washington,
D.C.), Nov. 2006, at 17, available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per12-02.pdf (reporting
that in 1995, 401(k) plans offered an average of six funds, and that by 2005, the average had increased to fourteen).
141
See, e.g., Emily Brandon, How Many 401(k) Investment Options Do You Want?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/money/blogs/planningto-retire/2009/10/2/how-many-investment-options-do-you-want-in-a-401k.html (stating that
most plans have between ten and nineteen options, but some have more than twenty-five).
142
Economics of 401(k), supra note 139, at 1.
143
Id. at 9.
144
See Kelly K. Spors, Small 401(k) Plans Often Pay Big Fees, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2009, at
R3 (describing the proposed disclosures). The legislation would also require providers to
disclose conflicts of interest such as any relationships they have with financial advisors. Id.
145
See id. (explaining that “employees in 401(k) plans would get a more specific
breakdown” of the fees they pay).
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tions that would require comparable disclosure to employers under
ERISA section 408(b)(2) and to plan participants under sections
146
147
404(a) and (c). To date, these regulations have not been adopted.
148
ERISA also imposes disclosure obligations upon employers. The
plan administrator must provide a summary plan description to plan
149
In addition, the plan must file an annual report departicipants.
150
scribing its financial condition and operations.
The IRS, the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), and the Department
of Labor have jointly determined the required disclosures that must
151
These disclosures debe made in the annual report, Form 5500.
scribe various plan features and are accompanied by schedules that
152
include financial statements and information on service providers.
In 2007, in response to ongoing concerns about conflicts of interest, the
Department of Labor increased the Form 5500 disclosure requirements
153
concerning compensation provided by the plan to service providers.
II. THE MARKET FOR MUTUAL FUNDS AND RELATED PRODUCTS
A. Evidence on the Effectiveness of Market Discipline
At the core of Jones v. Harris Associates are the operation of the mutual fund market and the question of whether competitive forces are
154
Commentators have debated this
sufficient to discipline fund fees.

146

See Reasonable Contract or Arrangement Under Section 408(b)(2), 72 Fed.
Reg. 70,988 (proposed Dec. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (proposing
disclosure for 408(b)(2) plans); Fee and Expense Disclosures to Participants in Individual Account Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 20,457 (proposed Apr. 25, 2007) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (proposing disclosure for 404(a) plans).
147
See EBSA Unified Agenda Fact Sheet, Service Provider Disclosure to Plan Fiduciaries, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/unifiedagenda/ebsafall2009/1210-AB08fs.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (stating intention to publish a final regulation in May 2010).
148
29 U.S.C. §§ 1021–1024 (2006).
149
Id. §§ 1021(a), 1024(b).
150
Id. §§ 1021(b)(1), 1023. Plans are also required to file supplemental and terminating reports. Id. §§ 1023(b)(2)–(c).
151
See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10(d) (2009) (providing the form for annual reports).
152
See, e.g., IRS, 2009 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 5500 7-12 (2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i5500.pdf (setting out disclosure requirements).
153
Annual Reporting and Disclosures, 72 Fed. Reg. 64,710 (Nov. 16, 2007) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2520).
154
No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/
09pdf/08-586.pdf.

FISCH FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

Rethinking Securities Intermediary Regulation

7/24/2010 12:01 PM

1987

155

point extensively. At a minimum, the mutual fund market presents
some anomalies to those who would characterize it as competitive.
The analysis in this Article focuses on the retail market for mutual
funds. As commentators have explained, the mutual fund market is
segmented—institutional investors can purchase different funds, gen156
erally with lower expenses, than can retail investors.
As of the end of 2008, the average annualized cost to a retail inves157
tor of an equity mutual fund was approximately 0.99 percent.
Ac158
cording to the Investment Company Institute, this cost reflects a
substantial and persistent downward trend in fee levels—in 1980, the
159
average stock fund cost an investor 2.32 percent per year. Fees vary
160
considerably depending on fund type.
Actively managed funds
161
charge higher fees than indexed funds.
Equity funds typically cost
162
163
Funds involving non-U.S. securities or
more than bond funds.
small-capitalization companies cost more than funds investing in
164
large-capitalization domestic issuers.

155

Compare Brief of Robert Litan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5,
Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010) (“[M]arket forces cannot be
relied upon to constrain the fees charged by mutual funds to competitive levels.”), with
John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 163 (2007) (“[T]he mutual fund industry’s market structure is consistent with competition providing strong constraints
on advisory fees.”).
156
See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual
Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1032-33 (2005) (examining evidence suggesting market segmentation and noting that the presence of sophisticated investors does not protect the less
sophisticated if the market is segmented); cf. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 634
(7th Cir. 2008) (“The sophisticated investors who do shop create a competitive pressure that protects the rest.”), vacated, No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010).
157
INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 60-61.
158
The Investment Company Institute is a private membership organization of
U.S. investment companies. Its membership includes “SEC-Registered funds, their investment advisers, underwriters and fund directors.” Inv. Co. Inst., About ICI: Membership, http://www.ici.org/about_ici/membership (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
159
INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 60-61.
160
See id. at 64-67 (summarizing expense ratios by fund type).
161
See id. at 64, 67.
162
Id. at 64.
163
Id. at 64, fig.5.4.
164
See id. at 64 (“[S]mall- and mid-cap stocks tend to be more costly to manage.”);
see also DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, REPORT ON MUTUAL FUND FEES AND EXPENSES tbl.9
(2000) (comparing relative fees across fund categories).
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The most substantial component of most mutual fund fees, and
165
the component most commonly criticized as excessive, is the management fee—the fee paid to the fund’s investment advisor. As indicated above, concerns about excessive management fees led Congress
to adopt statutory changes mandating independent director oversight
and imposing a fiduciary duty on investment advisors in connection
166
Jones concerns the manner in which
with their compensation.
courts should evaluate whether the applicable fees meet the fiduciary
duty test of ICA section 36(b). Although the Supreme Court adopted
167
the Gartenberg multifactor test, it is unclear how an advisor’s fee can
be excessive if it is set by competitive market forces.
In a highly influential article, John Coates and R. Glenn Hubbard
168
argue that the mutual fund market is, in fact, highly competitive.
To support their claim, they cite the substantial number of mutual
funds; the lack of industry concentration; the ability of new funds and
fund families to enter the market; the extensive distribution channels
through which funds are sold; the decline, over time, in average fees;
and, perhaps most important, investor responsiveness to fees through
169
Specifically, Coates and Hubbard find that
investment decisions.
“holding other factors constant, investors shift substantial amounts of
170
This responassets out of high-fee funds and into low-fee funds.”
171
siveness suggests effective market discipline over fees.
Indeed, by most standard measures, the mutual fund market appears highly competitive. The industry currently boasts approximately
172
9000 mutual funds offered by approximately 700 different sponsors.
Entry into the market is easy, as evidenced by the fact that new en165

Notably, however, a fund’s management fee is often proportionate to the other
fees, which are typically subjected to far less scrutiny. See, e.g., PETER J. WALLISON &
ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIVE EQUITY 79-80 (2007) (suggesting that fund advisors
have little incentive to minimize other fund expenses because directors typically analyze management fees on a “cost-plus” basis).
166
See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
167
Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586, slip op. at 17 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-586.pdf.
168
See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 155, at 153 (“[P]rice competition is in fact a
strong force constraining fund advisors . . . .”).
169
Id. at 163.
170
Id. at 180.
171
The growth of the Vanguard Group, known for its low fees, into one of the
largest fund families also suggests effective market discipline. Significantly, a recent
Morningstar study found that the Vanguard Group created $189 billion of wealth for
its shareholders over the 2000–2009 time period. Mamudi, supra note 13.
172
INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 13 fig.1.6, 15 fig.1.9.
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trants have successfully attracted billions of dollars in assets. Mutual
funds are marketed through a variety of channels, including brokers,
174
fund supermarkets, direct advertisements, and sales to investors.
The market share of fund complexes has changed substantially and
continually over time. As the Investment Company Institute observes,
“of the largest 25 fund complexes in 1985, only 10 remained in this
175
top group in 2008.” Finally, although large fund complexes increa176
singly dominate, the overall level of industry concentration is consis177
tent with a competitive industry.
Competition also appears to have reduced fund fees. Data collected by the Investment Company Institute shows the average expense ratio for an equity mutual fund declined from 2.32% in 1980 to
178
0.99% in 2008.
Products that are widely offered face stiff price
competition. Over the past several years, two major mutual fund
companies—Fidelity and Charles Schwab—both reduced fees on their
popular equity index funds, seemingly in an effort to compete with
Vanguard, which has historically been known for its low expense ra179
tios. Mutual funds also face increasing competition from ETFs.
Yet the story is incomplete. First, the evidence that fees are decreasing is not clear-cut. The SEC found that average expense ratios rose
during most of the period from 1979 to 1999, although it noted that
growth in fund size, an increase in the number of specialized funds,
and changes in distribution and sales fees created methodological is180
sues that impeded direct comparisons.
Alan Palmiter reports that
“[w]eighted average expense ratios for equity funds grew from 0.64% in

173

See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 155, at 168 tbl.4 (listing the twenty largest
equity funds in 2004 that did not exist in 1994).
174
See id. at 170-71 (examining distribution channels).
175
INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 21.
176
See id. (“The share of assets managed by the largest 25 firms increased to 75
percent in 2008 from 68 percent in 2000. In addition, the share of assets managed by
the largest 10 firms in 2008 was 53 percent, up from the 44 percent share managed by
the largest 10 firms in 2000.”).
177
“The mutual fund industry ha[d] a Herfindahl-Hirschman index number of 433
as of December 2008.” Id. Numbers of less than 1000 indicate an unconcentrated industry. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 15 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.
178
INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 60-61.
179
See, e.g., David Bogoslaw, Behind Schwab’s Fee-Cutting Frenzy, BUSINESSWEEK.COM,
May 6, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/may2009/pi2009056_
885433.htm (reporting on Fidelity’s decision to cut fees in March 2005 and Charles
Schwab’s reduction of fees in May 2009).
180
DIV. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 164 (noting comparisons over time).
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181

1980 to 0.92% in 2004.” Most recently, fund fee rates have increased
182
an average of five percent in the wake of the stock market decline.
Second, in a competitive market, prices of similar products tend to
converge. Yet, as Peter Wallison and Robert Litan reveal, fee differentials within the mutual fund industry persist, and the level of dispersion
183
is surprisingly high.
Even among funds that seem to offer similar
products, the range of fees is substantial, with some funds charging
184
fees that are almost three times those of their competitors. Perhaps
more surprising, the dispersion of expense ratios in the U.K. mutual
185
fund market is far smaller, although its market contains fewer funds.
Third, it is unclear what justifies the existing fee differentials.
Coates and Hubbard argue that price dispersion in the mutual fund
industry can be explained by product differentiation and search costs.
But are the mutual funds that charge different fees really different?
Although the large number and wide variety of mutual funds may
make price comparisons difficult, price variation appears among
products that are readily identified as substantially similar. Vanguard’s Equity Index 500 fund, for example, has an expense ratio of
186
0.18%, while UBS’s S&P 500 Index fund, class C, has an expense ra187
tio of 1.45%.
Wallison and Litan detail the variation in fees for indexed mutual funds, which do not require professional stock-picking
181

Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 190 (2006).
182
Allan Roth, Mutual Fund Fees Jump 5 Percent, CBS MONEYWATCH.COM, Aug. 17,
2009, http://moneywatch.bnet.com/investing/article/mutual-fund-fees-jump-5-percent/
331641. Concededly, these rates were applied to a smaller asset base as a result of the
stock market decline.
183
See WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 165, at 8-9 (explaining that the mutual fund
industry “does not appear to conform to the ‘law of one price’”).
184
Id. at 9 (reporting a difference in cost of almost 300 percent within a sample of
811 actively managed equity funds).
185
Id. at 10. Wallison and Litan attribute this phenomenon to differences in the
regulatory structure. See id. (“In the United Kingdom, mutual funds are generally contractual arrangements between advisers and investors; intervening corporate structures . . . have no voice in the setting of fees and expenses of advisers . . . .”). Interestingly, the size of mutual fund fees varies significantly by country. See Ajay Khorana,
Henri Servaes & Peter Tufano, Mutual Fund Fees Around the World, 22 REV. FIN. STUD.
1279, 1280 (2008) (explaining that the average expense ratio of equity funds by country varies from 1.05% to 2.56%). Canadian investors pay some of the highest fees—an
average of 2.56% at the time of the Khorana et al. study. Id.
186
THE VANGUARD GROUP, VANGUARD 500 INDEX FUND PROSPECTUS: INVESTOR
SHARES & ADMIRAL SHARES 3 (Apr. 29, 2009).
187
UBS GLOBAL ASSET MGMT., UBS S&P 500 INDEX FUND PROSPECTUS 6 (Sept. 28,
2009), available at www.ubs.com/2/e/us_library/mutual/sp500_prospectus.pdf. The
UBS S&P 500 Index Fund is currently being liquidated. Id. at 10.

FISCH FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

7/24/2010 12:01 PM

Rethinking Securities Intermediary Regulation

1991
188

talent and which should exhibit identical performance.
Similarly,
Edwin Elton et al. find that costs for S&P 500 index funds can vary by
189
more than two percent per year.
Are investors paying for differentiated advisory services? Classic
efficient market theory suggests that, in the long term, mutual fund
190
managers should not systematically beat the market. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that mutual fund returns tend to converge to
191
This does not mean, however, that all managers are
the mean.
equally talented. The empirical literature is in disagreement on the
extent to which mutual fund managers exhibit stock-picking ability or
market timing, but recent studies identify a subset of managers who
192
In most cases, however, even
are able to outperform the market.
188

See WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 165, at 121 n.8 (asserting that fee differentials exist among essentially identical funds).
189
See Edwin J. Elton et al., Are Investors Rational? Choices Among Index Funds 1
(N.Y.U., Working Paper No. SC-AM-02-08, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1300816 (finding differences in costs and returns despite the fact that the
funds hold the same portfolios).
190
See, e.g., Christine Benz, What the Data Say on Active vs. Passive Funds, MORNINGSTAR.COM, Mar. 5, 2010, http://www.morningstar.com/cover/videocenter.aspx?
id=328998 (interviewing Morningstar’s John Rekenthaler, who states that “two-thirds
of fund managers will underperform over a long period of time”); see also, D. Bruce
Johnsen, Myths About Mutual Fund Fees: Economic Insights on Jones v. Harris 7 (George
Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09 - 49, 2009) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1483862 (“Regardless of the level of the advisory fee . . . any
expected abnormal return to a manager’s superior stock-picking skill will be competed
away by investors chasing the prospect of capturing the associated rents.”).
191
Although a variety of scholars have studied persistence in mutual fund returns,
the general consensus, consistent with the findings in Mark Carhart’s influential article,
is that superior returns do not persist in the long term. See Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 79-81 (1997) (finding that expenses and
transaction costs explain some degree of persistence, but that the evidence does not
support the existence of skilled portfolio managers who can consistently beat the market). Carhart does find consistent underperformance by the worst performing mutual
funds. Id. at 80; see also HOSSEIN KAZEMI ET AL., CTR. FOR INT’L SEC. & DERIVATIVES
MKTS., PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE FOR MUTUAL FUNDS: ACADEMIC EVIDENCE 13 (2003),
available at http://cisdm.som.umass.edu/research/pdffiles/performancepersistence.pdf
(finding little support for performance persistence or stock-picking ability from 1997 to
2002); Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Jeffrey A. Busse, Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 594-95 (2004) (finding that persistence in mutual fund
returns is a short-term phenomenon); Ronald N. Kahn & Andrew Rudd, Does Historical
Performance Predict Future Performance?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 1995, at 43, 49-50
(finding “no evidence of persistence for performance among equity mutual funds”).
192
See, e.g., Robert Kosowski et al., Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New
Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551, 2553 (2006) (finding that a sizeable
minority of mutual fund managers pick stocks well enough to cover their costs); Malcolm Baker et al., Can Mutual Fund Managers Pick Stocks? Evidence from Their
Trades Prior to Earnings Announcements 3 (Nov. 13, 2007) (unpublished manu-
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superior performance on a precost basis does not lead to superior in193
vestor returns once costs are taken into account.
Moreover, even if managers have different abilities to generate re194
turns, so long as there are decreasing returns to scale, inflows to talented managers should eventually reduce returns to competitive le195
vels. This reduction means that, although skilled managers may earn
economic rents from their ability, investors do not earn superior returns.
Because mutual fund advisors are typically compensated as a percentage of assets under management, skilled managers achieve these
rents by attracting investment into their funds. Studies convincingly
demonstrate that the largest factor influencing fund inflows is the
196
fund’s past performance.
Although fund inflows will reward the
manager for superior past performance by increasing assets under management, if that performance does not persist, entering investors will not
beat the market. As a result, investors should not be willing to pay higher fees, on a percentage basis, based on the fund’s past performance.
More importantly, whether or not a subset of fund managers can
consistently outperform the market, most do not. Therefore, most investors will not be able to select a mutual fund that provides superior

script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=570381 (finding evidence that fund managers do have some degree of stock-picking skill); Yong Chen et al., Measuring the Timing Ability and Performance of Bond Mutual Funds 30, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 15318, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15318
(finding that a number of bond fund managers demonstrate investment ability, but
that “investment fees and trading costs absorb the superior returns (and then some)”).
193
See Chen et al., supra note 192, at 31 (finding no significant positive performance by bond mutual funds after controlling for costs).
194
See, e.g., Joshua M. Pollet & Mungo Wilson, How Does Size Affect Mutual Fund Behavior? 30 (H.K. Univ. of Sci. & Tech. Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 07-06, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=918250 (providing “evidence that the proximate
cause of diminishing returns to scale for mutual funds is the inability to scale an investment strategy as the fund becomes large”).
195
See Jonathan B. Berk & Richard C. Green, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in
Rational Markets, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1269, 1271 (2004) (“New money flows to the fund
[with superior managers] to the point at which expected excess returns going forward
are competitive.”).
196
See, e.g., Richard A. Ippolito, Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality: Evidence
from the Mutual Fund Industry, 35 J.L. & ECON. 45, 56 (1992) (finding a statistically significant relationship between fund growth and past performance); Prem C. Jain & Joanna
Shuang Wu, Truth in Mutual Fund Advertising: Evidence on Future Performance and Fund
Flows, 55 J. FIN. 937, 939 (2000) (finding that funds advertising higher returns subsequently attracted significantly more inflows than the control groups); Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589, 1619 (1998) (finding that
consumers base their decisions on past fund performance, but do so asymmetrically).
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returns and will be unlikely to benefit from investing on the basis of a
fund’s historical performance.
Instead, as empirical studies have repeatedly shown, the most consistent predictor of a fund’s return to investors is the fund’s expense
197
ratio.
Funds with high expense ratios underperform their peers on
198
an after-cost basis.
Vanguard founder, John Bogle, observed that
“industry experts and academics have been saying for decades . . . ‘that
199
expenses are the most powerful indicator of a fund’s performance.’”
This correlation is due in part to the simple fact that fees reduce the
investors’ net returns and in part to the effect of compounding on
200
Even before costs are reflected in relong-term investor returns.
turns, however, there is little evidence that higher fees are correlated
201
with increased performance. Despite these studies, which have been
widely reported in the news media, investors apparently persist in be202
lieving the opposite: that higher fees result in higher performance.
In sum, the empirical data are mixed. Although Coates and Hubbard cite the inflow of money into funds with lower costs or better
203
performance, money continues to flow into funds with higher costs
197

See, e.g., Roth, supra note 182 (“[T]he only factor that is predictive of a fund’s
relative performance against similar funds is fees.”). Significantly, however, these empirical studies often focus on expense ratios rather than management fees. One recent
study finds some evidence that funds with the highest management fees outperform
their peers. See John A. Haslem et al., Identification and Performance of Equity Mutual
Funds with High Management Fees and Expense Ratios, J. INVESTING, Summer 2007, at 32,
50 (suggesting that “higher management fees may add value to active portfolio management and contribute to improved performance measures”).
198
See, e.g., Haslem et al., supra note 197, at 50 (finding that higher expense ratios
correlate negatively with performance).
199
John C. Bogle, A New Order of Things—Bringing Mutuality to the “Mutual
Fund,” Manuel F. Cohen Memorial Lecture at the Georgetown University Law Center
(Feb. 19, 2008) (quoting Morningstar), in 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 471, 492 (2008).
200
See, e.g., Roth, supra note 182 (explaining the effect that compounding can
have on returns).
201
See Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, The Relation Between Price and Performance in
the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153, 2154 (2009) (“[F]unds with worse before-fee
risk-adjusted performance charge higher fees.”); see also Press Release, Standard & Poor’s,
Funds with Low Expense Ratios Outperforming Their More Expensive Peers over Long
Term, Says S&P (June 11, 2003), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/
spf/pdf/media/expenseratios.pdf (finding that funds with below-average expense ratios outperformed funds with above-average expenses “over a one, three, five, and tenyear annualized basis”).
202
See, e.g., Neil Weinberg, Fund Managers Know Best, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 220
(reporting that eighty-four percent of respondents surveyed believe higher fees result
in higher performance).
203
See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 155, at 183-85 (finding total assets “very responsive to fees”).
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and poor performance as well. Investors fail to respond to chronic
poor performance by withdrawing their funds, allowing some of the
204
worst performing mutual funds to survive. The mutual fund market
offers extensive evidence of the long-term survival of funds that consistently underperform the market and simultaneously charge higher
relative fees. Indeed, the very factors that Coates and Hubbard cite as
evidence of market competition—easy access to fund performance
and expense information, multiple distribution channels, and so
205
forth—pose a puzzle as to why such funds persist.
The data do not conclusively establish either a competitive market
or its absence, but they present anomalies that appear inconsistent
with a standard market explanation. Problematically, while the empirical evidence suggests that investors cannot outperform the market
through their choice of funds, the existing market structure, which
includes a choice of almost 10,000 intermediated retail products with
a wide range of fees, offers evidence that investors continue to seek
206
outperformance.
In addition, as detailed further below, regulatory
constraints, methodological challenges, and a lack of transparency
frustrate efforts to assess the degree to which management adds sufficient value to justify the cost associated with actively managed products.
B. Methodological Challenges to Studying the Mutual Fund Market
Methodological challenges limit the ability of investors and researchers to evaluate fund performance and to identify relationships
204

See Jonathan B. Berk & Jing Xu, Persistence and Fund Flows of the Worst Performing Mutual Funds 16 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/department/Seminar/2004Fall/MicroFall2004/
micro-berk-paper2-persist-120204.pdf (finding that investors in the worst performing
funds are unwilling to withdraw their money).
205
Coates and Hubbard point to the existence of persistent prices differences in
other product markets and attribute that persistence to differences in buyer preferences. Coates & Hubbard, supra note 155, at 195-97. Although buyers might well be
willing to pay a higher price when purchasing a large screen television in order to patronize a local vender or enjoy the services of a full service retailer, it is not clear that
comparable differences characterize the mutual fund market. Moreover, the authors
provide no evidence that those funds that charge higher fees offer differentiated services.
206
Indeed, the industry markets these products on the premise that they can deliver superior returns to a low-cost indexed fund or ETF. Compare Charles Schwab &
Co., Actively Managed Funds: Seeking Competitive Performance, ON INVESTING, Spring
2010, at 33, 33 (advising potential investors “looking to beat the market . . . to consider
including actively managed mutual funds in [their] portfolio[s]”), with Johnsen, supra
note 190, at 44 (“It is clear that what investors own when they buy fund shares does not
include an expectation of sharing in any abnormal returns to an active fund manager’s
superior stock picking skill.”).
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207

between performance and fees.
Fund performance is highly time
208
sensitive.
The choices of time period and start date have a substantial effect on one fund’s performance relative to that of another. Even
when examined over three-, five-, and ten-year periods, funds may shift
their relative positions. Part of the reason for these differences is that
fund returns vary based on risk, investment horizon, and asset alloca209
tion. The percent of cash held by a fund, for example, can cause the
fund to lag a bull market but outperform during a bear market. As
Ross Miller observes, Jeff Vinik’s badly timed decision to move more
than a quarter of the Magellan fund’s assets into fixed income securities caused the fund to lag its benchmark by over ten percent for
210
1996. Similarly, a substantial number of stock-focused mutual funds
were holding unusually high levels of cash in April 2009, as the stock
211
For some of these funds, the cash holdings remarket hit its low.
duced the impact of the market downfall, but it is unclear whether the
cash positions reduced the profitability of the subsequent market rebound as well.
In addition, because investor money flows into and out of funds
continuously, a fund’s reported return over a given time period does
not necessarily reflect the return achieved by individual investors who
212
entered and exited the fund during that time period. Mutual funds
typically report (and empirical studies typically use) time-weighted returns, which reflect the return on the fund’s assets averaged over time.
If the total amount of the fund’s assets varies substantially over the time
207

See, e.g., Eero J. Pätäri, Do Hot Hands Warm the Mutual Fund Investor? The Myth of
Performance Persistence Phenomenon, INT’L RES. J. FIN. & ECON., Dec. 2009, at 117, 134
(concluding that efforts to evaluate performance persistence are highly sensitive to
sample selection and methodology).
208
See, e.g., Benz, supra note 190 (quoting John Rekenthaler as stating that, when
funds beat their relevant index, “[t]hose tend to be accidents of a time period”).
209
See infra note 350 and accompanying text (detailing the importance of asset
allocation).
210
Ross M. Miller, Stansky’s Monster: A Critical Examination of Fidelity Magellan’s “Frankenfund” 1 (Feb. 22, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=964824.
211
Diya Gullapalli, More Stocks Funds Declare Cash King, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2009, at
C9 (warning that “cash-laden stock funds risk alienating investors if the market rallies
and they still are on the sidelines”).
212
See, e.g., MORNINGSTAR, FACT SHEET: MORNINGSTAR INVESTOR RETURN (2006),
available at http://corporate.morningstar.com/us/documents/MethodologyDocuments/
FactSheets/InvestorReturns.pdf (explaining the concept of investor return); see also Ilia
D. Dichev, What Are Stock Investors’ Actual Historical Returns? Evidence from Dollar-Weighted
Returns, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 386, 386 (2007) (distinguishing between dollar-weighted performance and buy-and-hold performance).
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period, however, the average investor may earn substantially more or less
than the time-weighted average. This alternative measure of return—
investor-weighted or dollar-weighted return—is particularly important if
strong mutual fund performance attracts investment inflows because,
even if the return on newly invested dollars is low, the fund’s timeweighted return may remain positive for a substantial period of time.
Russel Kinnel offers an example: the volatile CGM Focus Fund
has one of the highest returns for a large-cap growth fund, providing a
ten-year annualized return of around nineteen percent (ranking it
213
first in its Morningstar category). It achieves this return by making
214
When those bets pay off, the Fund does
big and risky sector bets.
215
well and attracts new money.
That new money may arrive just in
time to experience the large losses that are equally likely with a risky
investment strategy. Kinnel observes that while the CGM Focus Fund
earned a ten-year annualized return of 17.8% during the period he
examined, its investors suffered an annualized 16.8% loss during that
216
A recent article extends this analysis and finds
same time period.
that individual investors engage in mutual fund trading strategies that
generate poor performance even if the funds themselves are perform217
Even if some fund managers exhibit short-term stocking well.
picking skill, “it is clear that the higher returns earned at the short ho218
rizon are not effectively captured by individual investors.”
That a fund’s reported expense ratio does not always capture its
total costs further impedes evaluation of the relationship between cost
219
and performance. The type of cost most commonly excluded from
220
the expense ratio is the fund’s trading costs or commissions. Trad213

Russel Kinnel, Why Your Results Stink, KIPLINGER’S PERS. FIN., Nov. 2009, at 35.
Id.
215
For example, the Fund’s assets under management grew from less than a billion in 2004 to slightly over two billion in 2006. CAPITAL GROWTH MGMT., CGM FOCUS
FUND 47TH QUARTERLY REPORT 7 (2009), available at http://cgmfunds.com/pdf/200906-30-focus-quarterly.pdf. In 2007, the fund reported an eighty percent return, and by
year-end, its assets under management had grown to over five billion. Id.
216
Kinnel, supra note 213.
217
Andrea Frazzini & Owen A. Lamont, Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and the
Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 299, 319 (2008).
218
Id.
219
In addition to trading costs, funds may incur interest costs and costs associated
with maintaining short positions, among others. These costs are particularly significant for funds that use leverage or aggressive trading strategies.
220
John M.R. Chalmers et al., An Analysis of Mutual Fund Trading Costs 10-11
(Nov. 23, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
195849. The SEC does not require mutual funds to disclose trading commissions as a
214
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ing costs are not easy to extract from a mutual fund’s mandated dis221
closures, but a careful examination of trading costs in 2001 concluded that, for large equity funds, trading costs averaged forty-three
222
A slightly older study expercent of the funds’ expense ratios.
amined a sample of equity mutual funds and found that trading costs
223
averaged 0.78% of fund assets per year.
The significance of trading costs varies from fund to fund. Although funds may pay different commission rates, depending on their
size or business relationships, the most significant component of total
224
trading cost is turnover. Fund turnover rates vary substantially : the
225
CGM Focus Fund reported a turnover rate of 504% in 2008, while
226
the turnover rate for the Vanguard S&P 500 index fund was 6%.
Karceski et al. found that, for funds with the highest turnover rates,
227
In some
brokerage commissions alone averaged 1.67% of assets.
228
cases, a fund’s trading cost exceeded its expense ratio.
Even index

percentage of assets under management. According to the SEC, trading commissions
are not included in fund expense ratios
because under generally accepted accounting principles they are either included as part of the cost basis of securities purchased or subtracted from the
net proceeds of securities sold and ultimately are reflected as changes in the
realized and unrealized gain or loss on portfolio securities in the fund’s financial statements.
Request for Comments on Measures to Improve Disclosure of Mutual Fund Transaction Costs, Securities Act Release No. 8349, Exchange Act Release No. 48,952, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,313, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,820 (Dec. 24, 2003); see also
Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 32, at 4554 (rejecting the suggestion that trading
costs be included in expense ratio). Instead, funds must disclose their turnover ratio
and the total dollar amount of brokerage commissions they paid. See id. (adopting a
requirement that funds report their turnover ratios, but not actual trading costs, in the
summary prospectus).
221
The dollar amount of brokerage commissions is not even included in the mutual
fund prospectus. To obtain this information, an investor must consult a separate document: the “Statement of Additional Information.” See SEC, supra note 37.
222
Jason Karceski et al., Mutual Fund Brokerage Commissions 9 ( Jan. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.zeroalphagroup.com/news/ZAG_
mutual_fund_true_cost_study.pdf.
223
Chalmers et al., supra note 220, at 11.
224
The turnover rate is typically much higher for actively managed funds, but it
can vary for a variety of reasons, including management strategy, the percentage of institutional ownership, and the frequency with which investors enter and exit the fund.
225
CAPITAL GROWTH MGMT., supra note 215, at 8.
226
VANGUARD GROUP, supra note 186, at 15.
227
Karceski et al., supra note 222, at 8.
228
See id. at 10 (“In some cases, the total costs of trading are more than double the
level of the expense ratio.”).
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funds can have trading costs that vary enough to lead to significant
229
differences in performance.
The foregoing suggests that fund costs may be higher than they
appear—but costs can be lower as well. In particular, funds often reduce fees below those to which they are contractually entitled through
230
voluntary fee waivers. As Bruce Johnsen observes, “forty percent of
231
equity funds from 1998 to 2004 waived fees annually.”
Because fee
waivers reduce the actual costs below those reflected in the fund pros232
pectus, the amounts reflected in empirical studies may be overstated.
C. The Effect of Selling Agents on Market Discipline
Why might a market with easy entry and extensive competition
nonetheless show signs of market failure? One possible explanation,
suggested above, is inadequate transparency. If investors lack adequate
information to evaluate the costs and performance of mutual funds,
233
they may make poor investment decisions.
Another factor may be
the transaction costs associated with exit. The sale of a mutual fund is
a recognition event that requires an investor to pay income tax on any
capital gain. Investors who hold mutual funds in taxable accounts may
be reluctant to shift their holdings to another fund because of the impact of this tax. Back-end loads—fees charged to withdraw or redeem
fund holdings—if applicable, are another cost of exiting.
Commentators have also attributed failure of the mutual fund
market to limitations on investor rationality. Donald Langevoort has
warned that consumer decisionmaking in the mutual fund context
234
Jim Cox
does not appear to be consistent with rational behavior.
229

See Anne Tergesen & Lauren Young, Index Funds Aren’t All Equal, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 19, 2004, at 122 (reporting that in 2003, eighty percent of index funds
tracked by Morningstar “fell short of the performance ideal of a plain-vanilla index
fund: to deliver the benchmark’s return, minus the fund’s expense ratio”).
230
The use of fee waivers, which effectively mask price competition, is imposed on
the market by the governance requirements associated with advisory contracts. Fund
managers require shareholder approval, through a vote on a new advisory contract, to
raise fees, but managers can voluntarily lower fees without shareholder approval. As a
result, the contractual rate may be higher than that which would occur in the absence
of regulatory constraints. I am grateful to Eric Roiter for this observation.
231
Johnsen, supra note 190, at 36.
232
See, e.g., Gil-Bazo & Ruiz-Verdú, supra note 201, at 2155 n.3 (acknowledging
that, because of fee waivers, “the loads typically reported in databases . . . can often
overestimate effective loads”).
233
The SEC has repeatedly reexamined mutual fund disclosure requirements.
The result of these efforts is considered in Section III.B., infra.
234
Langevoort, supra note 156, at 1042-55.
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and John Payne argue that mutual fund purchasers exhibit bounded
235
rationality.
Although an extensive examination of the literature is
beyond the scope of this Article, empirical studies provide support for
these concerns. Studies show, for example, that investors largely ignore cost information and focus instead on past performance infor236
237
mation, and that they rely heavily on advertising and brand name
238
(identification with a fund family).
One well-known study documents that investors respond to mutual fund name changes, moving
money into funds with names that reflect a “hot investment style,”
even when these changes are purely cosmetic and reflect no changes
239
in fund strategy or performance.
This Article focuses on another factor: the importance of sales
agents in the market for retail investments. The Investment Company
Institute reports that, of investors owning mutual funds outside of
employer-based retirement accounts, “77 percent own fund shares
240
through professional financial advisers.”
Investors purchase their
235

James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 930-35 (2005).
236
See Brad M. Barber et al., Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Effects of Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows, 78 J. BUS. 2095, 2107 (2005) (demonstrating that mutual fund inflows
are generally unrelated to fund expenses); Beth A. Pontari et al., Regulating Information
Disclosure in Mutual Fund Advertising in the United States: Will Consumers Utilize Cost Information?, 32 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 333, 336-49 (2009) (demonstrating the insignificance
of cost information in fund advertising); Daniel Bergstresser & James Poterba, Do After-tax Returns Affect Mutual Fund Inflows? 1-3 (Feb. 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=253914 (citing studies showing net fund
inflows are positively related to past fund performance and demonstrating that aftertax returns outperform pretax returns in explaining inflows); see also Alan R. Palmiter
& Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Investors: Divergent Profiles, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
934, 981-90 (2008) (discussing additional research showing the relative unimportance
of cost information to fund investors).
237
See, e.g., Michael A. Jones & Tom Smythe, The Information Content of Mutual Fund
Print Advertising, 37 J. CONSUMER AFF. 22, 24-25 (2003) (documenting the importance
of mutual fund advertising and arguing that effective regulation of such advertising is
difficult).
238
See, e.g., Vikram Nanda et al., Family Values and the Star Phenomenon: Strategies of
Mutual Fund Families, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 667, 668-69 (2004) (finding that mutual fund
families with at least one star performer draw disproportionate inflows to other funds
within the family).
239
Michael J. Cooper et al., Changing Names with Style: Mutual Fund Name Changes
and Their Effects on Fund Flows, 60 J. FIN. 2825, 2853 (2005).
240
INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 68; see also Brian K. Reid & John D. Rea, Mutual
Fund Distribution Channels and Distribution Costs, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. PERSP.,
July 2003, at 1, 5 (reporting that, as of 2001, only fifteen percent of households made
their primary purchases of mutual funds directly or through a discount broker or fund
supermarket). The selection of mutual funds in 401(k) plans raises analogous problems that are discussed below.
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funds through investment professionals despite the ability to purchase
most mutual funds directly, often at lower cost, from the fund sponsor
241
or through a fund supermarket.
This manner of compensating brokers creates an obvious conflict
of interest—the brokers’ incentive is to maximize their compensation,
not to offer the investor the best mutual fund option. The funds that
compensate brokers most highly are those that charge higher loads
and 12b-1 fees, but these higher fees, in turn, reduce investor returns.
Complex fee structures heighten the conflict. Two-thirds of mutual
funds have more than one share class, each of which has a different
242
fee structure. In most cases brokers have monetary incentives to sell
243
the class of shares that is least advantageous to investors.
Indeed,
FINRA recently warned investors that brokers might be improperly
recommending an inappropriate class of shares because the brokers
244
would receive higher commissions.
Brokers receive additional compensation for selling preferred funds
through soft-dollar arrangements and revenue sharing. Soft dollars involve institutional money managers paying for services—typically research services—indirectly through brokerage commissions, rather than
245
directly. The brokerage commissions normally exceed the rates that
the institutions would pay and have the effect of bundling together the
payments for execution services and for research. The advantage of soft
dollars for fund advisors is that soft dollars both mask the cost of purchased research and pass that cost through to investors in the mutual
fund. If the research were purchased separately, it would either reduce
246
the advisor’s profit or increase fund expenses, which are reported to
investors. Commissions, however, as discussed earlier, are not reported
as part of the disclosure of fund expenses. For brokers, soft dollars
represent an additional source of revenue, making it more attractive for
241

See IN. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 68 (explaining that investors compensate
these professionals through the payment of loads and 12b-1 fees).
242
Id. at 27.
243
See Edward S. O’Neal, Mutual Fund Share Classes and Broker Incentives, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1999, at 76, 83 (highlighting “the obvious conflict of interest between mutual fund brokers and investors”).
244
FINRA Investor Alerts, Class B Mutual Fund Shares: Do They Make the Grade?,
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/MutualFunds/p005975
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
245
See Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV.
39, 50-52 (2007) (describing the use of soft dollars).
246
See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Spill, Regulation of Mutual Funds: What You Don’t Know Can Hurt
You, N.H.B.J., Spring 2005, at 50, 52 (2005) (explaining that the advisor can increase its
profit by avoiding paying for research services out of its contracted advisory fee).
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them to direct investor assets to funds that use soft dollars. Despite
these potential conflicts, the SEC has confirmed the legality of soft dol247
lars, pursuant to certain guidelines.
248
Mutual fund companies also pay brokers for shelf space. As one
court explained, “[A] shelf-space agreement occurs when a mutual
fund pays [additional compensation] in exchange for the broker249
dealer preferentially marketing its shares.” The additional compensation is typically, in addition to any commission applicable at the time
of the initial sale, an ongoing payment based on a percentage of assets
that continue to be invested in the mutual fund. Preferential marketing can include more frequent recommendations, including the funds
on a preferred list, and naming them on the brokerage firm’s website.
Revenue sharing can be a major component of a brokerage firm’s
overall income, although most brokers do not disclose the precise dollar amounts they receive. Edward Jones’s disclosure in connection with
the settlement of an SEC enforcement action is an indication of the
250
magnitude of revenue sharing. Edward Jones disclosed income from
revenue sharing, for the year ending December 31, 2009, of $94.2 mil251
252
lion. Its total net income for the same period was $164.3 million.
If the economic incentive to recommend funds that engage in
revenue sharing was not sufficient, some brokers explicitly exclude
fund families that do not participate in revenue sharing from accessing their registered representatives and promoting their funds. As
247

See Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 54,165,
71 Fed. Reg. 41,978, 41,978 ( July 24, 2006) (recognizing and interpreting the scope of
the safe harbor for fund managers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(e),
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)). But cf. D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance:
Law and Economics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1545, 1548 (2009) (describing the SEC’s guidance as “a laundry list of legally arbitrary and economically irrelevant formalisms”).
248
Previously, mutual funds also compensated brokers for preferential treatment
through directed brokerage, which involved a mutual fund directing its trades (and
the resulting commissions) to a brokerage in exchange for preferred marketing. See,
e.g., Spill, supra note 246, at 52 (describing directed brokerage as a “polic[y] and procedure[] . . . structured to benefit the adviser instead of the shareholder”). In 2004,
the SEC amended Rule 12b-1 under the ICA to prohibit directed brokerage. 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.12b-1(h)(1) (2009).
249
People v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 130, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
250
See Press Release, SEC, Edward Jones to Pay $75 Million to Settle Revenue Sharing Charges (Dec. 22, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-177.htm.
251
Edward Jones, Disclosure Information, http://www.edwardjones.com/en_US/
disclosures/rev_sharing/disclosure_information/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
252
Id.
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Morgan Stanley explains, “Fund families that do not remit revenuesharing payments typically will not be provided such access [to branch
offices and advisors] and will not participate in or receive other pro253
motional support.”
Empirical evidence suggests that brokers’ monetary incentives—
rather than fund costs or performance—drive recommendations.
Studies show that brokers direct most investment dollars into higher254
cost load funds and that “broker-dealers typically market load funds
255
to their less sophisticated customers.”
Studies find that brokerdirected mutual fund investments result in lower returns to investors
than funds acquired through direct purchases. Daniel Bergstresser et
al., for example, find that “[f]unds sold by brokers underperform
those sold through the direct channel, even when returns are calcu256
They also find “no evidence
lated on a pre-distribution-fee basis.”
that, in aggregate, brokers provide superior asset allocation advice
257
that helps their investors time the market.”
Research also shows that broker-directed load funds have higher
258
operating expenses. This result extends even to index funds that do
not attempt to beat the market or to differentiate themselves based on
259
Thus, the broker
the stock-picking talent of portfolio managers.
role in selling mutual funds to retail investors offers a convincing explanation, by itself, of why market forces may not operate to control
fees or to select efficient or high performing funds. Broker intermediation operates in direct opposition to the disciplinary capacity of
253

Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, Mutual Funds: Revenue Sharing Fund Families,
http://www.smithbarney.com/products_services/mutual_funds/investor_information/
revenueshare.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
254
See Daniel Bergstresser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual
Fund Industry, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 4129, 4153 (2009) (reporting that broker clients pay
loads that are as much as 417 basis points higher than those that direct purchasers pay).
255
Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 303, 328 (2008).
256
Bergstresser et al., supra note 254, at 4140.
257
Id. at 4146.
258
See, e.g., Todd Houge & Jay Wellman, The Use and Abuse of Mutual Fund Expenses,
70 J. BUS. ETHICS 23, 24 (2007) (arguing that load fund investors pay higher operating
expenses for having funds “marketed to them” with no corresponding increase in quality).
259
See id. at 27-28 (finding that no-load index funds had an average expense ratio of
nineteen basis points, compared to fifty-five basis points for load funds); see also Mercer
Bullard & Edward S. O’Neal, The Costs of Using a Broker to Select Mutual Funds 2 (Nov.
30, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.zeroalphagroup.com/
studies/113006_Zero_Alpha_Group_Fund_Democracy_Index_Funds_Report.pdf (finding that brokers directed investors into load index funds that had higher operating expenses than no-load funds, before counting brokers’ fees).
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market forces. The role of the broker is particularly troubling in light
of the fact that the least-informed investors may rely on brokers due to
their inability to sort and select mutual fund investments directly.
Moreover, the role of brokers may explain, in part, the unusually high
level of management fees paid by investors in Canadian mutual
funds—eighty-five percent of those funds are sold through a financial
260
advisor rather than through direct marketing.
The SEC has apparently recognized the potential conflict of interest implicated by revenue sharing, but its response has been minimalist.
In its most recent amendments to the prospectus disclosure requirements, the SEC adopted a requirement that mutual funds disclose that
they may compensate brokers for the sale of fund shares and that this
261
compensation may create a conflict of interest.
Funds are not required to disclose the amount or structure of this compensation. In defending the rule, the SEC stated that it was sufficient to put investors on
262
notice of the potential conflict.
When investors purchase mutual funds through 401(k) plans, the
agency costs and conflicts of interest are similar. Under ERISA section 404(c), employees in a 401(k) plan choose their investments, but
they are limited in that choice to the investment alternatives offered
by the plan. These alternatives are selected by the plan provider. Importantly, although plans may offer employees different types of
funds, they do not typically offer multiple funds with the same invest263
ment strategy. Thus, a plan may offer investors a choice between a

260

E-mail from Joanne De Laurentiis, President & CEO, The Inv. Funds Inst. of
Canada, to Peter Tufano, Professor of Fin. Mgmt., Harvard Bus. Sch., et al. (Oct. 27,
2006), available at http://randsco.com/_img/blog/0702/ific_response.pdf.
261
The SEC’s specific language is:
If you purchase the Fund through a broker-dealer or other financial intermediary (such as a bank), the Fund and its related companies may pay the intermediary for the sale of Fund shares and related services. These payments may
create a conflict of interest by influencing the broker-dealer or other intermediary and your salesperson to recommend the Fund over another investment. Ask your salesperson or visit your financial intermediary’s Web site for
more information.
Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 32, at 4557.
262
See id. at 4558 (“[W]e are adopting a statement that will alert investors generally
to the payment of compensation and the potential conflicts arising from that payment.
An investor could then obtain further detail from his or her salesperson or the intermediary’s Web site.”).
263
Some plans offer participants substantially broader choices by including a brokerage window as an investment option. Through that window, investors can purchase
stocks and mutual funds directly, as with a standard brokerage account.

FISCH FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2004

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

7/24/2010 12:01 PM

[Vol. 158: 1961

money market fund, an equity index fund, and various domestic and
international actively managed funds. An investor who prefers an index fund, however, is limited to the provider’s choice of fund. As a
result, plan participants are limited to choosing among fund types
and, within a given category, cannot choose the lowest-cost alternative.
Fees charged by mutual funds in 401(k) plans vary tremendous264
ly. According to a recent Deloitte survey, the average “all-in” fee was
265
0.93% of assets per year, which is slightly less than the average mu266
tual fund expense ratio. The sampling methodology in the Deloitte
study has been criticized, however, and some commentators argue that
267
fees as high as 3% are common. Fees at small firms tend to be much
higher; the Deloitte study found that plans with fewer than 100 partici268
pants pay an average of 2.03% of the plans’ assets in annual fees.
401(k) plans introduce an additional layer of revenue sharing because of the role of the plan provider or trustee. It is common practice for the mutual funds selected for inclusion in a 401(k) plan to
share a portion of the revenues they collect from plan participants
269
with the plan provider.
In turn, the plan provider may reduce the
administrative expenses charged to the plan. As a result, the employees bear the costs of running the plan but pay those costs indirect264

See, e.g., Anne Tergesen, Does Your 401(k) Cost Too Much?, BUSINESSWEEK.COM,
June 7, 2004, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_23/b3886145.htm
(reporting that in 2004, plan fees ran as high as three percent); Press Release, Inv. Co.
Inst., A Number of Factors Impact Retirement Plan Fees, ICI-Deloitte Study Finds Plan
Size, Contribution Rates, and Auto Enroll Associated with Lower Fees (Apr. 14, 2009),
available at http://www.ici.org/pressroom/news/09_news_dc_401k_fee_study (reporting
that, among 130 plans studied, the median fee “was 0.72 percent of assets, within a range
from 0.35 percent (the 10th percentile) to 1.72 percent (the 90th percentile) of assets”).
265
DELOITTE, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION/401(K) FEE STUDY 18 (2009), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_09_dc_401k_fee_study.pdf.
266
Significantly, neither the average mutual fund expense ratio nor the all-in fee
in the Deloitte study includes trading costs. See id. at 16 (describing components of the
all-in fee).
267
See Posting of Ryan Alfred to Bright Scope Blog, Reconciling the 401k Fee Estimates of the ICI and Its Critics, http://www.brightscope.com/blog/2009/05/13/
reconciling-the-401k-fee-estimates-of-the-ici-and-its-critics/ (May 13, 2009, 18:23 EST)
(identifying sampling problems in Deloitte study).
268
DELOITTE, supra note 265, at 20; see also Spors, supra note 144 (reporting on
possible legislation to respond to high fees for small 401(k) plans).
269
See, e.g., Lynn O’Shaughnessy, A 401(k) Picks a Mutual Fund. Who Gets a Perk?,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, at BU5 (citing Michael Weddell, a retirement consultant at
Watson Wyatt Worldwide, as stating that 90% of 401(k) plans engage in revenue sharing); see also Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, 588 F.3d 585, 590 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining
that a trust agreement between the employer and the plan trustee required them to
keep the amounts of the revenue sharing payments confidential).
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ly through the fees charged to them by the participating mutual
funds. In many cases, neither plan participants nor the employer it270
self know the amount of revenue sharing that occurs.
As with broker-directed mutual fund sales, revenue sharing in
401(k) plans creates two problems. First, the hidden nature of the
payments may mislead participants to believe that their investment
costs are lower than they actually are. Second, and more problematic,
the potential for compensation may influence the plan provider’s selection of investment alternatives. As the Wall Street Journal put it, “At
issue . . . is whether companies managing the plans are receiving payments in return for including certain fund companies in their
271
plans.”
Such payments might cause employers to include inferior
funds in their plans and to spurn strong performers that do not engage
in revenue sharing. According to press reports, for example, fund administrators have refused to include Vanguard funds in their plans
272
upon learning that Vanguard “won’t pay to play.”
The importance of fund selection in retirement plans is heightened because it can influence investor decisions outside of the plans.
Studies suggest that mutual fund investors demonstrate brand loyalty
273
and will purchase multiple funds from a single fund family.
Moreover, a majority of households purchase their first mutual fund
274
As a result, their
through an employer-sponsored retirement plan.
employers’ selection of plan options is likely to influence their subsequent investment decisions.
270

See, e.g., Tom Lauricella, Spitzer Aims at Another Mark: Fee Disclosure, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 10, 2006, at C1 (explaining that employers and plan participants are often “kept
in the dark” as to the exact amount of revenue sharing).
271
Id.
272
Editorial, The Benefits Aren’t Mutual, STAR-NEWS (Wilmington, N.C.) Feb. 22,
2004, at 6E, available at 2004 WLNR 17445525. Vanguard seems to have overcome this
problem by becoming one of the largest 401(k) plan administrators. See, e.g., Ross
Kerber, More Dip Early into Funds for Retirement, BOSTON GLOBE, June 6, 2008, at 1A,
available at 2008 WLNR 10690503 (describing Fidelity Investments, CitiStreet, and
Vanguard as the three largest administrators of 401(k) plans).
273
See Nanda, supra note 238, at 668-69 (explaining how star funds attract new
money growth for fund families). Investing in a single family is likely to be a poor
strategy. See Edwin J. Elton et al., The Impact of Mutual Fund Family Membership on Investor Risk, 42 J. FIN & QUANT. ANALYSIS 257, 274-75 (2007) (finding that funds within a
single fund family have a higher correlation than funds selected from different families, thereby exposing investors to higher risk).
274
See Characteristics of Mutual Fund Investors, 2009, RES. FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co.
Inst., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2009, at 9, available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/fmv18n8.pdf (stating that sixty-two percent of mutual fund–holding households purchased their first fund through an employer-sponsored retirement plan).
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Therefore, the conflicts and incentives faced by selling agents—
including brokers, financial advisors, and 401(k) plan sponsors—have
the potential to influence their investment choices, and empirical data
suggest that these conflicts impact investor welfare. Selling agents
face limited accountability, however, for their choices and recommendations.
Regulators have engaged in some enforcement of broker suitability obligations in the mutual fund context. FINRA has brought
several enforcement actions focusing on broker recommendations of
275
inappropriate share classes.
FINRA has also fined several brokers
276
The New York State Attorney General’s
for shelf-space violations.
Office and the SEC have also investigated specific instances of revenue-sharing in an effort to determine whether the practice has
277
crossed the line and turned into the payment of kickbacks.
Private litigation has had limited success. Courts have generally
held, for example, that retail brokers are not fiduciaries for their cus278
tomers unless they possess investment discretion.
Indeed, when
Congress passed the Investment Advisers Act, it explicitly exempted
brokers, despite the knowledge that brokers might have business inter279
ests or conflicts of interest that could bias their recommendations.

275

See, e.g., Press Release, FINRA, FINRA Fines Banorte Securities International $1.1
Million for Improper Sales of Class B Mutual Fund Shares (Oct. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Newsreleases/2008/P117233 (reporting settlement of
FINRA enforcement action involving sales of inappropriate share class); Press Release,
FINRA, NASD Files Enforcement Actions Involving Unsuitable Sales of Mutual Funds
(Aug. 12, 2003), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Newsreleases/2003/
p002885 (announcing that the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), later consolidated into FINRA, brought enforcement actions based on brokers’ recommendations of unsuitable class B shares).
276
See Thomas Derpinghaus, Two Brokerage Firms Will Pay Fines, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
2005, at C19 (reporting that the NASD fined two brokers “for giving preferred sales
treatment to mutual funds in exchange for brokerage commissions and other payments”).
277
See, e.g., Phyllis Feinberg, SEC’s Investigation Shines Light on DC Fee Practices,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July 12, 2004, at 4 (describing the SEC’s request to mutual
funds for “detailed answers about how revenue-sharing fees are structured”); Anne
Kates Smith, Shedding Light on 401(k) Fees, KIPLINGER’S PERS. FIN., Feb. 2007, at 19 (observing that “[s]ome forms of revenue sharing bear an unsettling similarity to kickbacks” and describing regulatory concerns).
278
See Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083,
1094- 95 (2007) (citing authority for this determination); cf. O’Malley v. Boris, 742
A.2d 845, 849 (Del. 1999) (“[B]rokers must act in the customer’s best interests and
must refrain from self-dealing unless the customer consents, after full disclosure.”).
279
See Fisch, supra note 278, at 1094 (noting that when the exemption was created,
brokers “were known to provide . . . ‘brokerage house advice’”). Pending legislation
would explicitly establish a fiduciary duty for brokers, akin to that of investment advi-

FISCH FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

Rethinking Securities Intermediary Regulation

7/24/2010 12:01 PM

2007

Instead, customers alleging broker misconduct or conflicts of interest must generally rely on the rules of the self-regulatory organiza280
tions (SROs). The suitability requirement and the know-your281
customer rule obligate brokers to recommend only investments that
282
are suitable in light of their customers’ investment objectives.
Private enforcement of these rules is problematic. Most courts have dismissed suitability claims, at least to the extent that they do not plead
fraud, holding that investors lack a private right of action under SRO
283
rules. In addition, claims by retail investors against their brokers are
typically subject to FINRA-controlled arbitration pursuant to the stan284
dard terms of retail brokerage agreements.
Although arbitration
proceedings may, in some cases, allow investors to recover, the arbitration process has been challenged as unprincipled, arbitrary, and bi285
ased against the customer. Moreover, most arbitrations are resolved
286
Judicial review, even of published awards, is “severely liin secret.
287
mited.”

sors. See The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. (2009).
280
FINRA Rule 2310, the suitability rule, permits brokers “to recommend a securities
transaction to a customer only if the recommendation suits the customer’s investment
portfolio, financial situation and needs.” See FINRA, BrokerCheck FAQ, http://
www.finra.org/Investors/ToolsCalculators/BrokerCheck/P015174 (last visited Apr. 15,
2010).
281
New York Stock Exchange Rule 405 requires brokers to “[u]se due diligence to
learn the essential facts relative to every customer.” NYSE Rule 405(1), N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) ¶ 2405 (2002).
282
See generally Bradley J. Bondi, Securities Arbitrations Involving Mortgage-Backed Securities and Collateralized Mortgage Obligations: Suitable for Unsuitability Claims?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 251 (2009) (exploring these obligations).
283
See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 200 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“NASD regulations do not give rise to a private right of action.”); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding no private right of action under
either the suitability rule or the know-your-customer-rule).
284
See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J.
LEGAL STUD. 109, 112-16 (2010) (describing arbitration provisions in customer agreements).
285
See, e.g., Bondi, supra note 282, at 268 (describing arbitrators as applying a
“flexible” standard); Choi, Fisch & Pritchard, supra note 284, at 116 -19 (summarizing
claims of arbitrator bias); Dan Solin, FINRA: A Wily Fox Guarding Your Nest Egg, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-solin/finra-a-wilyfox-guarding_b_403552.html (describing FINRA as a “shill for the securities industry”).
286
Choi, Fisch & Prichard, supra note 284, at 116 (observing that seventy to eighty
percent of arbitration claims are settled or resolved through means other than an arbitrator decision and noting that no public information is available on these claims).
287
See Bondi, supra note 282, at 269 (explaining that most arbitration decisions are
unpublished and “under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court generally may not vacate
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Apart from procedural impediments, private litigation suffers
from a more general problem—the difficulty of establishing that a
broker recommendation of a specific mutual fund is unsuitable. Although as a general matter, suitability claims by brokerage customers
288
are common, they are typically filed for complex and high-risk investments such as collateralized mortgage obligations and credit default swaps. Mutual funds are, by contrast, diversified, low cost, and
relatively safe, which is why regulators and commentators have identified them as suitable investments for retail investors. Absent outright
fraud, it is difficult for an investor to demonstrate lack of suitability
simply by demonstrating that an alternative fund has lower fees or historically higher returns. Even when a broker’s recommendation is
both inappropriate and based on personal financial incentives, an investor must establish a causal connection between the conflicts of in289
Finally, courts are unlikely to impose
terest and the investor’s loss.
liability, even where an investor relies on a broker, if the investor could
290
have ascertained the relevant information from fund disclosures.
Recent litigation involving 401(k) plans illustrates these problems.
Plan participants have brought a number of lawsuits alleging that revenue sharing and other conflicts of interest have led employers and
plan providers to offer inappropriate investment choices, rather than
291
lower-cost and better-performing alternatives.
Plaintiffs claim that
because of these arrangements, they have paid excessive fees and received inferior returns on their contributions. To date, plaintiffs have
not succeeded at establishing a breach of fiduciary duty based on
an arbitration award because the arbitrator made erroneous findings of fact or misapplied the law”).
288
Id. at 257 (reporting that in 1998, ninety-five percent of broker liability insurance filings were based on suitability claims).
289
See, e.g., Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., No. 97-1272, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9489, at *13-20 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (dismissing a claim that, because of financial
incentives, a broker pushed certain in-house mutual funds “regardless of suitability, market conditions, or customer need” because the plaintiff had not alleged a causal connection between these recommendations and subsequent losses).
290
See, e.g., DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007)
(rejecting a suit alleging that a broker recommended an inappropriate share class due
to a conflict of interest on the basis that “investors could calculate on their own whether one class of shares [was] more economically attractive than another”).
291
See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 578 (7th Cir. 2009) (claiming that
defendants provided poor investment options and failed to disclose the plan’s fee structure); Taylor v. United Techs. Corp., No. 06-1494, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19059, at *30-35
(D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2009), aff’d, No. 09-1343, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 26068 (2d Cir. Dec. 1,
2009) (claiming that the plan offered mutual funds with unreasonably high fees and expenses and paid excessive compensation to its recordkeeper).
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292

these allegations.
The court’s decision in Hecker v. Deere is typical.
In addition to rejecting claims that Fidelity Trust (the plan trustee)
and Fidelity Research (the advisor to the funds in the 401(k) plan)
293
owed fiduciary duties to the plan beneficiaries, the court concluded
that the plan’s selection of twenty mutual funds could not be improper where plaintiffs had the option of selecting alternative funds
294
through a brokerage link.
A recent decision by the Eighth Circuit offers plaintiffs some
hope. In Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court concluded that the
295
plaintiff’s allegations —which it described as amounting to an asser296
tion that the $9.5 billion Wal-Mart 401(k) plan offered a limited
menu of inferior investment options that “were chosen to benefit the
297
trustee at the expense of the participants” —were sufficient to state a
298
Specifically, the court stated that
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
the allegations, if substantiated, could show that “the process by which
appellees selected and managed the funds in the Plan would have
299
been tainted by failure of effort, competence, or loyalty.”
Even if plaintiffs succeed in some of these cases, it is unlikely that
litigation will have a significant impact on plan policies. As with other
claims of mismanagement, any claim of improper fund selection is
likely to be effectively rebutted by a showing that the defendants engaged in a diligent process—meaning that they received and evaluated

292

Recently, however, Caterpillar announced that it had settled a lawsuit challenging the fees in its 401(k) plan for $16.5 million. See Emily Lambert, Caterpillar Suit
Could Lower 401(k) Fees, FORBES.COM, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/
2009/11/11/caterpillar-pension-lawsuit-personal-finance-retirement-plan.html (suggesting settlement may “set a precedent for other companies to follow”).
293
Hecker, 556 F.3d at 584.
294
Id. at 581.
295
The plaintiff alleged that the plan offered employees a small group of investment
options that charged unreasonably high fees and expenses and fell short of the indices
that they were designed to track. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 590 (8th
Cir. 2009). The plaintiff alleged that the defendants imprudently offered only retail-class
mutual fund shares despite the fact that, because of the size of Wal-Mart’s 401(k) plan,
they had access to lower cost alternative investment options. Id. Finally, the complaint
alleged that the funds included in the Plan made revenue-sharing payments to the trustee, Merrill Lynch, and that these payments were not made in exchange for services rendered, but rather were a quid pro quo for inclusion in the Plan. Id.
296
Mark Bruno, Wal-Mart Suit Hits 401(k) Fees, FINANCIALWEEK.COM, Apr. 28, 2008,
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080428/REG/156632963/
1028.
297
Braden, 588 F.3d at 596.
298
Id. at 591.
299
Id.
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300

appropriate information concerning the plan’s investment options.
In addition, to show damage, plaintiffs must be able to demonstrate
that the plan’s offerings were clearly inferior and that a causal relationship exists between plan deficiencies and an actual investment loss.
The methodological challenges identified above will impede these
showings. Absent the imposition of more rigorous obligations on plan
providers in connection with the selection of plan options, the agency
costs inherent in the 401(k) structure are likely to persist.
III. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING REGULATORY STRUCTURE
The mutual fund market is characterized by extensive regulatory
intervention, but it is unclear that this regulation is effective in improving market discipline and protecting investors. This Part identifies critical limitations in the effectiveness of the existing regulatory
structure—in particular the corporate governance and disclosure requirements—in meeting these objectives.
A. Corporate Governance
As described in Part I, the ICA regulates mutual funds in a manner similar to the regulation of operating companies. The statute requires mutual funds to use traditional corporate governance mechanisms, including shareholder voting and oversight by a board of
directors. The board is required to monitor the investment advisor—
similar to the way an operating company’s board monitors the CEO—
and to review potential conflicts of interest, such as the investment ad301
Importantly,
visor’s execution obligations and use of soft dollars.
the SEC has established a variety of exemptive rules that permit mutual funds to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions subject to
the approval of the board or, in some cases, the independent direc302
tors. The board is also responsible for approving the investment ad300

See Taylor v. United Techs. Corp., No. 06-1494, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19059, at
*28 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2009) (“[T]he undisputed facts detail the evaluation and analytical process or ‘appropriate consideration’ by which UTC selected the mutual funds.”).
301
See, e.g., Commission Guidance Regarding the Duties and Responsibilities of
Investment Company Boards of Directors with Respect to Investment Adviser Portfolio
Trading Practices, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58,264, Investment Company
Act Release No. 28,345, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2763, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,646,
45,649-56 (proposed Aug. 6, 2008) (proposing guidance for fund directors in overseeing investment advisors’ use of soft dollars).
302
See, e.g., Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act
Release No. 7932, Exchange Act Release No. 43,786, Investment Company Act Release
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visor’s compensation. The ICA imposes fiduciary duties on the direc303
tors in performing these obligations.
In addition, mutual fund
shareholders, like shareholders of operating companies, exercise voting rights. Specifically, the shareholders elect the directors. Shareholders must also approve major structural changes, such as the conversion of a fund from open-end to closed-end (or vice versa), a
change in the fund’s concentration classification or other investment
objectives, and material changes in the advisory contract.
The utility of applying these corporate governance mechanisms to
the mutual fund context is unclear. Many commentators have argued
that the mutual fund board is worthless because it has no effective
304
In an operating company, the
power over the investment advisor.
board’s power to monitor management is premised on the board’s
305
statutory authority to hire and fire the CEO and other executives.
In recent years, boards have increasingly exercised this power to remove underperforming CEOs. Although mutual fund directors can,
in theory, terminate the advisory contract pursuant to their authority
under the ICA, such a decision is of little practical value because it ef306
The advisor provides all the operafectively terminates the fund.
tional components of the mutual fund; without it, the fund is simply a
pool of assets. The absence of an effective mechanism for influencing

No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001) (codified at C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 270, 274)
(amending exemptive rules in a manner designed to increase fund directors’ independence and efficacy).
303
Commentators have criticized the SEC for failing to enforce these fiduciary duties adequately. See, e.g., H. Norman Knickle, The Investment Company Act of 1940: SEC
Enforcement and Private Actions, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 777, 792 (2004) (“[T]he
Commission has not frequently filed 1940 Act charges against fund directors, advisers,
and officers for breach of fiduciary duties . . . .”); see also In re Hammes, Securities Act
Release No. 8346A, Investment Company Act Release No. 26290A, ( Jan. 7, 2004)
(Campos, Comm’r, dissenting), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/338346a.htm (criticizing an SEC settlement for failing to impose adequate sanctions on
outside directors).
304
See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1448-51 (2006) (describing the
lack of board power over investment advisors and portfolio managers); Caroline J. Dillon, Note, Do You Get What You Pay For? A Look at the High Fees and Low Protections of Mutual Funds, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 288 (2006) (“[T]he board’s negotiating
power is so limited that the investment adviser essentially can dictate the terms of the
[advisory] agreement.”).
305
See Birdthistle, supra note 304, at 1449 (noting that, although firing a CEO is
difficult, it is far easier than terminating an advisory contract).
306
See Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982)
(“[A] mutual fund cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser.”
(quoting S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4870, 4901)).
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the advisor’s behavior imposes a critical limit on a director’s ability to
307
act as an effective fiduciary.
Commentators have also questioned the ICA requirement that the
independent fund directors approve advisory fees. Wallison and Litan
make perhaps the strongest case, arguing that this requirement displaces market forces and produces a form of rate regulation analog308
ous to public utilities’ rate-setting process.
As they explain, boards
309
see their role as limiting the size of the advisor’s profit and, consequently, perform a type of cost-plus analysis in which they judge the
size of the management fee by reference to the fund’s administrative
costs. This “utility-like” process, they argue, “reduces or eliminates the
310
incentive of an adviser to reduce its costs.” Wallison and Litan also
evaluate the board’s role in addressing conflicts of interest and argue
that a trustee-custodian could perform this monitoring equally well
311
and more cost-effectively.
Despite these concerns, other commentators argue that the mutual fund board has value. Donald Langevoort argues that the board
offers at least the potential for a measure of fiduciary obligation as a
counterweight to the market pressures felt by mutual fund managers
312
313
and sponsoring firms.
Empirical research is even more positive,
identifying correlations between board independence and board ef314
fectiveness. Studies have found, for example, that boards with more
307

See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 156, at 1041 (“Whatever the merits of the debate in corporate law generally, the influences in the mutual fund marketplace are too
weak simply to presume that directors will act as faithful fiduciaries in the strong, legal
sense of the term.”).
308
WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 165, at 77.
309
Wallison and Litan explain that this approach is required by the Second Circuit’s decision in Gartenberg, which precludes boards from relying on comparisons with
the fees charged by other advisors. Id. To be fair, it is not clear that Gartenberg goes
this far; it simply holds that a board cannot rely on “prevailing industry advisory fees.”
Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929.
310
WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 165, at 80.
311
Id. at 107-16.
312
See Langevoort, supra note 156, at 1040 (“One can have relatively moderate expectations for the performance of disinterested directors and still believe that the
strategy adds some value, and there is a body of evidence to support this.”).
313
Not all the studies find evidence that independence is valuable. See, e.g., Stephen P. Ferris & Xuemin (Sterling) Yan, Do Independent Directors and Chairmen Matter?
The Role of Boards of Directors in Mutual Fund Governance, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 392, 393 (2007)
(finding no evidence that an independent board or an independent chair correlates
with the probability of a fund scandal or superior fund performance).
314
See generally Memorandum from Chester Spatt, Chief Economist, Office of
Econ. Analysis, SEC, to Inv. Co. File S7-03-04, Literature Review on Independent Mutual Fund Chairs and Directors (Dec. 29, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
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315

independent directors tend to negotiate lower fees, merge under316
performing funds more quickly, and are more likely to remove fund
317
Camelia Kuhnen constructs
managers who have performed poorly.
a more rigorous measure of independence using business connections
between directors and fund advisors and finds that these business con318
nections are positive predictors of expense ratios and advisory fees.
A significant limitation of the empirical literature is its inability to
319
determine causation.
Rather than causing better performance or
operations, an independent board may be the result of a fund advisor
or a fund family’s commitment to best operational practices and good
governance. An independent board may signal that the fund family is
attentive to its fiduciary obligations and seeks to minimize conflicts of
interest. It may also operate as a bonding or commitment device in
that, once an advisor has selected the initial independent directors,
those directors, and not the advisor, will choose the subsequent independent directors. Under this view, independent directors may well
be attentive and vigilant, but it is the advisor’s willingness to subject
itself to this oversight, and not the oversight itself, that accounts for
the empirical results.
It is also worth noting that some of the empirical results identified
above are consistent with the interests of the advisory firm itself, if not
the individual portfolio manager. An advisory firm does not wish to
suffer the outflows that may result from an underperforming fund,
nor does it want the fund family to suffer possible damage to its repuproposed/s70304/oeamemo122906-litreview.pdf (summarizing the empirical literature on board effectiveness).
315
See, e.g., Peter Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S.
Mutual Fund Industry, 46 J. FIN. ECON. 321, 323 (1997) ( “[L]ower fees are charged by
funds whose boards are smaller, whose boards have a larger proportion of independent members, and whose board members sit on a larger fraction of other boards for
the same sponsor.”).
316
See Ajay Khorana et al., Board Structure, Mergers and Shareholder Wealth: A Study of
the Mutual Fund Industry, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 571, 573 (2007) (“[F]und mergers . . . are
significantly more likely when the target underperforms and its board is composed
primarily of independent directors . . . .”).
317
See Bill Ding & Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance and Governance
Structure 25 (Dec. 9, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=687273 (“For . . . underperforming funds, it appears that the number of independent directors, proxied by the total number of directors, is the most important
predictor of replacement . . . .”).
318
Camelia M. Kuhnen, Business Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in
the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2185, 2186-89 (2009).
319
See Spatt, supra note 314, at 12-18 (identifying other problems with empirical
methodology in these studies).
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tation from a poor performer. Merging the fund or replacing the
portfolio manager does not discipline the advisory firm, but rather
benefits it. Indeed, it is unclear why fund families of any significant
size would require board action to replace a poorly performing portfolio manager—the only funds for which replacement is unlikely are
those in which the portfolio managers are sufficiently powerful within
the advisory firm itself. This explanation is consistent with the finding
that fund outflows were more likely to lead to the replacement of the
320
portfolio manager.
The rationale for providing mutual fund shareholders with voting
rights is even less compelling. The high percentage of small retail in321
vestors magnifies the traditional constraints on voting as an effective
corporate governance mechanism: collective action problems and rational apathy. The significance of these constraints is also increased
by the opportunity for shareholders to exit readily at NAV. That these
constraints are, in fact, operating is evidenced by the low percentage
of mutual fund shares that are voted by their beneficial owners. As
the Investment Company Institute noted in a 2005 report, only thirtytwo percent of mutual fund shares held in street name were voted by
322
beneficial owners. Commentators have observed that mutual funds
must engage in frequent and costly resolicitations because of their
323
Soliciting the proxies of muregular inability to obtain a quorum.
tual fund investors is costly and investors ultimately bear the cost
through increased expense ratios.
Because of the cost of proxy solicitation, most mutual funds do
not even hold regular annual meetings. Many do not hold meetings
at all unless there is an issue for which shareholder approval is re324
quired.
The absence of regular annual meetings highlights the in-

320

See Ding & Wermers, supra note 317, at 4 (“[F]unds with outflows are more likely to replace underperforming managers.”).
321
Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 60,215, 74 Fed. Reg.
33,293, 33,303 ( July 10, 2009) (describing mutual funds as having a “disproportionately large retail shareholder base”).
322
INV. CO. INST., COSTS OF ELIMINATING DISCRETIONARY BROKER VOTING ON UNCONTESTED ELECTIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY DIRECTORS 6 (2006), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/wht_broker_voting.pdf.
323
See, e.g., Richard M. Phillips, Deregulation Under the Investment Company Act—A
Reevaluation of the Corporate Paraphernalia of Shareholder Voting and Boards of Directors, 37
BUS. LAW. 903, 908-09 (1982) (describing the problematic need for frequent and costly
resolicitations).
324
See Letter from Jennifer S. Taub, Lecturer & Coordinator of the Bus. Law Program, Isenberg Sch. of Mgmt., Univ. of Mass., Amherst, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y,
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significance of shareholder voting rights. Indeed, in its recent approval of the New York Stock Exchange’s elimination of discretionary
broker voting for uncontested director elections, the SEC authorized
325
Consequently,
an exemption for investment company elections.
even when a mutual fund holds a meeting to elect directors, the result
is largely the product of broker votes. Given the financial ties between
brokers and mutual funds, this practice effectively ensures approval of
any proposed director candidates.
Unlike operating companies, mutual funds do not offer the potential for increased voting power in the event of a control contest. There
is no takeover market for mutual funds because there is no economic
justification for paying a premium for shares that trade at NAV. Similarly, the absence of arbitrage opportunities prevents hedge funds and
326
other activist shareholders from engaging in proxy contests.
The SEC has specifically described the ICA as preserving “share327
holder participation in key decisions.” Yet in reality, apart from the
toothless power to elect directors, mutual fund shareholder voting
power is generally limited to approving significant changes in invest328
329
Alment policy and material changes in the advisory contract.
though the SEC has interpreted the scope of the statute broadly—
330
requiring fund sponsors to take many issues to the shareholders —as
a practical matter, shareholder voting on these issues is unimportant,
given shareholder power to exit a fund at NAV upon an announced
change in investment policy. At its best, shareholder voting with reSEC (Aug. 13, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009127.pdf (describing the infrequency of shareholder meetings).
325
See Self-Regulatory Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 33,303.
326
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor
Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L.R. 1591, 1617 (2006) (identifying the
absence of arbitrage opportunities in the mutual fund market).
327
Self-Regulatory Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 33,303.
328
These include changing the fund’s concentration policy, borrowing money, and
ceasing to be an investment company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a) (2006). In addition, mutual
funds must also adopt fundamental policies with respect to key investment activities. See
Id. § 80a-8(b) (2006) (listing the policies that must be reported for fund registration).
These policies can be changed only by a shareholder vote. Id. § 80a-13(a).
329
Shareholders must approve the initial advisory contract. Id. § 80a-15(a) (2006);
17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1(b)(4) (2010). Following that approval, board approval can be
substituted for a shareholder vote. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15(a) to (b), 80a-13(a). Sections
80a-15(a)(3) and 80a-15(a)(4) also provide shareholder voting rights with respect to a
new management contract following the board’s termination of a management contract and any assignment of the contract. Id. § 80a-15(a)(3) to (4) (2006).
330
See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 323, at 903-04 (describing how the SEC has imposed “the corporate paraphernalia of shareholder voting”).
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spect to these issues provides value in that the proxy solicitation requirements alert investors to such changes. At its worst, shareholder
voting impedes fund flexibility. Contractual fee rates in advisory contracts may, for example, be set higher than they otherwise would be
because of the requirement that fund shareholders approve any at331
tempt by managers to raise fees, but not to lower them.
B. Disclosure
Perhaps the biggest failure of existing regulation is the scope and
structure of the disclosure requirements. Like the corporate governance provisions, mutual fund disclosure obligations are modeled after those of operating companies. Purchasing a mutual fund, however, is not the same as investing in an operating company.
The disclosures of operating companies provide investors and the
market with sufficient information about the issuer to value the company and its securities. Information about the issuer’s past performance, financial condition, and management team enable the market
to predict future cash flows, and discounting those future cash flows
leads to a determination of an appropriate market price.
For operating companies, the determination of market price
enables the application of market discipline. Investors adjust the
price at which they will trade in response to changes in the issuer’s
behavior and performance, and any failure of the market to respond
is addressed through arbitrage. Poorly performing firms face a higher
cost of capital and, in some cases, are taken over. Operating performance is likely to persist to a large degree from one period to the
next, at least to the extent that the firm’s assets, products, and policies
remain consistent.
Unlike operating companies, the prices of mutual fund shares are
fixed at NAV. Investors do not use discounted cash flow or other methodologies to value fund shares, and fund prices do not respond to
changes in fund performance, management, or investment objectives.
Although these changes may affect investor demand for shares,
changes in investor demand do not affect share price. Because share
price is fixed, it does not serve as a vehicle for the exercise of market
discipline. Similarly, investors cannot sell mutual fund shares short
and, even if hostile takeovers were possible, fund pricing is incompat331

Raising fees is a modification of the advisory contract that requires shareholder
approval. Managers can lower fees through a voluntary fee waiver. See supra note 230
and accompanying text (describing fee waivers).
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ible with a takeover premium. Finally, for most, if not all, mutual
funds, performance is not likely to persist. As a result, the primary
factors relevant to the investment decision include cost, risk, asset allocation, and diversification.
In order to evaluate these factors, mutual fund investors need information about fund structure, investment strategy, and expenses.
Investors choosing among mutual funds should be able to determine
readily the types of securities in which the fund invests and the extent
to which the fund is committed to specific asset types and classes (e.g.,
foreign versus domestic, debt versus equity, and small- versus largecap) or retains discretion to shift among asset classes in response to
market conditions. Investors also should be able to ascertain the extent to which the fund concentrates its investments within a limited
number of securities or industries and whether the fund uses leverage
or derivatives in its trading strategy. Investors should have access to
complete information about fund costs, including the incentive structure created by the fund’s payments to its portfolio managers, selling
brokers, and other service providers. Most importantly, investors
should be presented with information on the characteristics that distinguish a particular fund from its competitors.
Existing regulation allows, and in some cases creates affirmative
incentives, for funds to obscure this information. As indicated above,
although the SEC has repeatedly revised the provisions concerning
disclosure of fund expenses, those disclosures remain incomplete and
confusing. Investors report that they do not find these disclosures
332
helpful, and most do not even read them.
One example is operating expenses. Although the SEC has finally
mandated in its most recent amendments that fund turnover be included in the summary prospectus, it has not required disclosure of
brokerage commissions or other operating costs, and the turnover
disclosure provided does not furnish a ready mechanism for quantify333
ing those costs in a manner comparable to other fees.
The use of

332

According to the Investment Company Institute’s 2006 investor survey, only
thirty percent of recent mutual fund investors consulted shareholder reports before
their most recent purchase, and only thirty-four percent used the fund prospectus.
INV. CO. INST., UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES FOR MUTUAL FUND INFORMATION 12 (2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_06_inv_prefs_full.pdf. In a
1996 survey, only fifteen percent of investors reported reading the mutual fund prospectus in its entirety. Id. at 25.
333
See supra notes 219-32 and accompanying text (discussing incomplete disclosure of fund operating costs).
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334

soft dollars also masks a fund’s true operating expenses. In light of
the demonstrated importance of both quantifying and adequately categorizing fund expenses, this lack of transparency is problematic. At
the same time, increasing investor attention to fund expenses creates
competitive pressure for funds to structure costs in ways that allow
their exclusion from the reported expense ratios, as the use of soft
dollars highlights.
Vague disclosure also reduces competition by preventing shareholders from evaluating the extent to which mutual funds differ along
critical factors such as diversification, asset allocation, and risk. In
turn, shareholder confusion may contribute to the degree of price
dispersion in the market. For example, although funds are required to
disclose their investment objectives, regulation does not require funds
to be specific or to explain how their approach differs from that of
their competitors. This leads to a situation in which hundreds of
funds, with very different investment strategies, disclose that their in335
vestment objective is “long-term capital growth.”
So-called “closet index funds” offer an example in which a lack of
336
disclosure leads to investor confusion.
Many actively managed mutual funds hold portfolios that do not differ significantly from the rele337
This strategy reduces the risk that the
vant index-fund benchmark.
fund will underperform the index; at the same time, the fund’s returns
are unlikely to differ from a comparable index fund, but come at a
higher cost. Investors who purchase closet index funds pay a premium
338
The
for active management while receiving index fund returns.

334

See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text (describing use of soft dollars).
See, e.g., AM. CENTURY INV., SUMMARY PROSPECTUS: DISCIPLINED GROWTH FUND
1 (2009), available at http://prospectus.americancentury.com/summary.asp? doctype=spro&clientid=amercentll&fundid=02507M675 (reporting such an objective).
336
See, e.g., Tom Lauricella, Professors Shine a Light into ‘Closet Indexes,’ WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 18, 2006, at C1 (describing characteristics and returns of closet index funds).
337
See, e.g., Lewis Braham, How to Spot A Closet Index Fund, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 6,
2004, at 108 (describing the Putnam Voyager Fund, which purports to be actively managed and has a one percent annual expense ratio, as a closet index fund because of
the similarity between its holdings and those of the Russell 1000 Growth Index); K.J.
Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure
That Predicts Performance 3 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 06 -14, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891719 (finding an increase in closet indexers
during the 1990s).
338
Indeed, because of the higher costs, closet index funds typically provide lower
returns than their indexed counterparts. See Braham, supra note 337, at 108 (explaining that, after subtracting its management fees, Voyager’s performance lags behind
that of the benchmark index); Cremers & Petajisto, supra note 337, at 3-4 (finding that
335
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problem could be addressed by more detailed requirements concerning the number of portfolio holdings or the degree to which the port339
folio differs from its relevant benchmark.
Incomplete disclosure of fund investment objectives and strategy
340
is one possible explanation for investors’ reliance on fund names.
The SEC has explicitly acknowledged that “investors may focus on an
investment company’s name to determine the company’s investments
and risks,” and that “the name of an investment company may com341
In light of the potential for
municate a great deal to an investor.”
investors to be misled by a fund’s name, the SEC adopted a rule in
2001 providing that if a fund’s name suggests that it focuses on a particular investment type, the fund must invest at least eighty percent of
342
This requirement, however, is only partially
its assets in that type.
effective. First, it still enables a fund to invest twenty percent of its assets elsewhere, allowing the fund’s risk and return profile to deviate
343
substantially from that suggested by its name. Second, it applies on344
ly to names that connote a generally accepted meaning. The impor-

closet indexers charge comparable fees to actively managed funds but tend to underperform both true actively managed funds and their benchmarks).
339
There are a variety of measures that can be used to assess the degree to which a
fund mirrors an index. Cremers & Petajisto offer a new measure of active investing in
their recent paper, which “decompos[es] any portfolio into a 100% position in its
benchmark index plus a zero-net-investment long-short portfolio on top of that.” Cremers & Petajisto, supra note 337, at 1-2. An alternative approach looks to the fund’s R²,
which is a measure of the degree to which a fund’s performance can be explained by the
benchmark’s performance. See Braham, supra note 337, at 109. Morningstar provides R²
statistics under modern portfolio statistics in its “ratings and risk” section. See, e.g., Morningstar, Fidelity Magellan Report, http://quicktake.morningstar.com/FundNet/
RatingsAndRisk.aspx?symbol=FMAGX&country=USA (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (reporting an R² for the Magellan fund of ninety compared to the S&P 500).
340
See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
341
Investment Company Names, Securities Act Release No. 7933, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,845, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,828, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 1917, 74 SEC Docket 313, 314-15 ( Jan. 16, 2001).
342
17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1 (2009).
343
See SEC, supra note 65 (warning investors that one-fifth of securities may not
correspond to the fund name and may be risky as a result).
344
See Mercer Bullard, Despite SEC Efforts, Accuracy in Fund Names Still Elusive, THESTREET.COM, Jan. 30, 2001, http://www.thestreet.com/story/1282823/despite-secefforts-accuracy-in-fund-names-still-elusive.html (explaining how “value” may not be
covered by SEC restriction); see also Donohue, supra note 46 (identifying examples of
fund names that conveyed use of derivatives in the fund’s strategy, including “income,”
“floating rate,” “high yield,” and “short term”).
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tance of fund names is evidenced by the surprising frequency with
345
which funds continue to change them.
Limited transparency also reduces shareholder oversight. Because
shareholders must approve significant changes in a fund’s investment
objectives, a fund can avoid the need for a shareholder vote by keeping
its disclosure vague or by disclosing that it retains the discretion to use
346
a variety of strategies. Fidelity’s Magellan Fund offers an example:
Fidelity Management & Research Company (FMR) normally invests the
fund’s assets primarily in common stocks. FMR may invest the fund’s assets in securities of foreign issuers in addition to securities of domestic issuers. FMR is not constrained by any particular investment style. At any
given time, FMR may tend to buy “growth” stocks or “value” stocks, or a
combination of both types. . . . FMR may also use various techniques,
such as buying and selling futures contracts and exchange traded funds,
to increase or decrease the fund’s exposure to changing security prices
347
or other factors that affect security values.

If a fund is not required to commit itself to a specific strategy or
allocation of assets, then fund managers can shift their investment
348
style and respond to trends without any advance notice. As a result,
funds may drift significantly from the holdings, investment style, and
349
Even in benign cases,
risk level that the investors initially selected.
these shifts are problematic if they are not transparent. Asset alloca345

See, e.g., Diya Gullapalli & Shefali Anand, The Bull Market in Mutual-Fund Name
Changes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2006, at C1, (reporting that 719 funds changed their names
in 2005).
346
See, e.g., NAKOMA MUTUAL FUNDS, NAKOMA ABSOLUTE RETURN FUND PROSPECTUS 2 (2009), available at http://www1.nakomafunds.com/portal/LinkClick.aspx?link=
NARFX+Prospectus_20090925_CURRENT.pdf&tabid=498&mid=1356 (“The Fund’s
investment objective and strategies are not designated ‘fundamental policies’ within
the meaning of the [ICA], and may be changed by the Fund’s Board of Trustees . . . without shareholder approval.”).
347
FIDELITY INVS., FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND PROSPECTUS (2009), available at
http://content.members.fidelity.com/epro/PROS/316184100/?format=HTML&part=F
RAMESET&app=RETAIL&consent=Y. Significantly, despite this broad disclosure, the
extent to which the Magellan Fund currently uses an active investing strategy is unclear.
See Braham, supra note 337, at 108 (describing Magellan as a “closet” index fund).
348
The Magellan Fund is frequently cited for style drift. See, e.g., Jerry Morgan,
Style Sticklers: Pension Consultants Policing Fund Managers to See That They Invest as Advertised, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1996, at D9 (“Magellan started 1995 as a diversified growth
fund, then invested more than 40% of its assets in technology stocks. Then it sold the
tech shares and jumped into government bonds in a big way.”).
349
See, e.g., Karen Hube, The Drifters, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2008, at R7 (reporting
that style drift among stock mutual funds has ranged from thirty-two to forty-six percent, with increases during market shifts); see also Moon Kim et al., Mutual Fund Objective Misclassification, 52 J. ECON. & BUS. 309, 311 (2000) (finding that over fifty percent
of mutual funds are misclassified and thirty-three percent are severely misclassified).
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350

tion policy is a critical determinant of fund performance. Disclosure
of asset allocation enables an investor to evaluate the fund’s performance in context as well as to determine the stability of the fund and
351
For these reasons,
how it fits within the investor’s overall portfolio.
services like Morningstar categorize funds and compare funds within
352
designated categories, such as “large-cap stock fund,” but the utility
of this information is undermined by style inconsistency and drift.
In the most problematic cases, managers may take an approach
that causes a fund’s risks to be very different from those perceived by
353
investors. Research suggests that agency problems are a likely factor
in explaining shifts in style, and that the resulting shifts are likely to
354
damage fund performance. Although funds are required to disclose
the composition of their portfolios, disclosure is only required on a
355
quarterly basis, allowing the opportunity for a substantial amount of
drift between reporting periods, even assuming that investors monitor
356
composition when it is disclosed.

350

See, e.g., Gary P. Brinson et al., Determinants of Portfolio Performance, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
July–Aug. 1986, at 39, 39 (documenting the overwhelming importance of asset-allocation
policy); Gary P. Brinson et al., Determinants of Portfolio Performance II: An Update, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 1991, at 40, 40 (reporting that asset allocation explains, on average,
91.5% of the variation in quarterly fund returns); Roger G. Ibbotson & Paul D. Kaplan,
Does Asset Allocation Policy Explain 40, 90, or 100 Percent of Performance?, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 26, 26 (finding that asset allocation “explained forty percent of the variation of returns among funds [and] virtually 100 percent of the level of fund returns”).
351
See Letter from Laura Paulenko Lutton, Senior Mutual Fund Analyst, Morningstar, Inc., to Nancy M. Moris, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-74.htm (advocating that the SEC require
funds to disclose asset allocation over the preceding three years).
352
See Wells Fargo, Morningstar Category Descriptions, https://www.wellsfargo.com/
investing/mutual_funds/morningstar_desc (listing Morningstar mutual fund categories
and descriptions).
353
See, e.g., Kathryn A. Holmes & Robert W. Faff, Style Drift, Fund Flow and Fund Performance: New Cross-Sectional Evidence, 16 FIN. SERVS. REV. 55, 56 (2007) (explaining that
style drift may expose investors to different risk levels or types than what they were expecting).
354
See Jennifer Huang et al., Risk Shifting and Mutual Fund Performance 25-26 (Univ.
of Tex. at Austin McCombs Sch. of Bus. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.
FIN- 04- 08, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108734 (suggesting “agency
problems play a role in explaining risk shifting behavior”); see also Keith C. Brown et
al., Staying the Course: The Role of Investment Style Consistency in the Performance
of Mutual Funds (Mar. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364737 (finding that funds that maintain consistent styles
outperform less style-consistent funds on a risk-adjusted basis).
355
17 C.F.R. §§ 249.331, 249.332, 274.128, 274.130 (2009).
356
See, e.g., Hube, supra note 349 (explaining that fund drift is difficult to monitor
because “information on fund holdings is not available to investors on a real-time basis”).

FISCH FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

7/24/2010 12:01 PM

[Vol. 158: 1961

A prominent recent example of lack of transparency involves target date funds. Target date funds are a relatively new type of mutual
fund, marketed primarily for retirement investing. Specifically, target
date funds offer investors professional allocation of their assets by
shifting from an equity portfolio in the early years toward an increasing percentage of fixed income securities both leading up to and fol357
lowing the target date, a shift that is termed the fund’s “glide path.”
As a result, the funds purport to meet the increasingly conservative investment needs of consumers as they age and approach retirement.
Target date funds received an explicit regulatory blessing in 2006
when Congress authorized them as the default investment option for
401(k) investments, thereby exempting from liability employers that
invested in target date funds on behalf of employees who did not de358
signate an alternative investment choice. This regulatory seal of approval, coupled with the apparent simplicity of target date funds, allowed them to accumulate $168 billion in aggregate assets by February
359
2008.
Yet things did not work out as planned. Initially, during the bull
market of the mid-2000s, some commentators criticized target date
360
fund investment allocations as unduly conservative.
These criticisms, coupled with pressure to generate high returns, led some target
date funds to invest substantial portions of their portfolios in riskier
investments. Some funds allocated as much as ninety-four percent of
361
their portfolios to equities. This strategy backfired when the market
crashed in 2008. The market downtown revealed that many target
date funds were far riskier than investors had expected. According to
the SEC, funds with target dates of 2010 had as much as seventy-nine
percent of their investments in stock when the market crashed, causing some of these funds to lose more, on a percentage basis, than the

357

See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Takes on Target-Date Funds, WALL ST. J., May 5,
2009, at C3 (explaining the “glide path” concept).
358
See Leslie Wayne, Mutual Funds with Targets, and Misfires, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2009, at B1 (describing the “safe harbor” for employers who automatically sent employee 401(k) money to target date funds).
359
Bob Frick, Target Funds Under Fire, KIPLINGER’S PERSONAL FINANCE, Feb. 2008,
at 34, 34.
360
See, e.g., Steven Goldberg, Target Funds Are Simply Flawed, KIPLINGER.COM, June
7, 2005, http://www.kiplinger.com/columns/value/archive/2005/va0608.htm (criticizing Vanguard and Fidelity target date funds as “too conservative”).
361
See Frick, supra note 359, at 34 (“In an effort to improve performance and break
from the pack, many target-date funds have boosted their holdings in riskier investments.”).
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362

S&P 500.
The public and media responded to these revelations by
attacking target date funds as insufficiently conservative.
363
It appears that target date funds suffered from several problems.
First, and most important, although the products that they offered varied tremendously, differences in investment objectives and asset allocation were not disclosed to investors. Funds with the same target
date could differ dramatically, making it difficult for investors to com364
pare them. Thus, an investor could not simply assume that all 2010
target date funds were equivalent or would meet the needs of an investor planning to retire in 2010.
In addition, many investors appeared to expect that the target
date reflected a date by which the majority of fund assets would be in365
vested in conservative, fixed income securities.
In contrast, fund
managers were making allocation decisions that reflected a longer
time horizon, with the objective of enabling fund assets to continue to
appreciate over the course of what might be an extended period of
retirement. These glide paths differed from one fund to another.
Perhaps most problematically, the funds were generally marketed
to investors with very limited investment expertise and were portrayed
366
as safe investments for retirement accounts.
The appeal of the target fund was the investor’s ability to delegate allocation decisions to

362

Wayne, supra note 358.
Similar issues have been raised by 529 plan funds, which are supposed to provide a vehicle for college savings. See, e.g., Shefali Anand & Craig Karmin, Oregon Sues
Over Risks Taken in Its ‘529’ Fund, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2009, at C1 (describing litigation
alleging that the Oppenheimer Core Bond fund, which was billed as conservative, became unduly risky); Jane J. Kim, Investors to Recover ‘529’ Losses, WALL ST. J., June 13-14,
2009, at B2 (describing a tentative settlement of the litigation).
364
See, e.g., Wayne, supra note 358, (quoting SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro as stating that 2010 target date funds had anywhere from twenty-one percent to seventy-nine
percent of their holdings invested in stocks).
365
See, e.g., Robert Powell, Target-Date Funds Under the Microscope, MARKETWATCH,
June 4, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/target-date-funds-under-themicroscope (“Folks on the cusp of retirement who purchased 2010 funds apparently
assumed that such funds would have little or no assets invested in stocks, but they got a
rude awakening . . . .”).
366
See, e.g., Lisa Shidler, Target Date Funds Increase Equity Exposure, INVESTMENT
NEWS, June 16, 2008, available at http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20080616/
REG/310303540 (describing target date funds as less transparent and difficult to understand, but quoting investment advisors as stating that such funds are suitable for
persons who lack investment expertise).
363
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expert fund managers, yet the broad differences among funds fru367
strated this objective.
Target date funds offer an example of disclosure failure, but they
raise a further question: to what extent is disclosure sufficient? Many
intermediated investments are complex financial products. Even with
extensive disclosure, evaluating their structure is difficult. Mutual
fund alternatives range from long-only index funds to products that
use leverage and derivatives to mimic hedge fund strategies. Examples of more complex mutual funds include the Nakoma Absolute Return Fund, which uses the long/short strategy of a traditional hedge
fund to seek “positive absolute returns with low volatility independent
368
of market conditions,” and the Direxion mutual funds, which offer
double the return, or double the inverse of the return, for a variety of
standard market indexes, such as the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ
369
Several fund sponsors—of which Direxion and Proshares are
100.
the best known—are marketing an array of leveraged and leveragedinverse ETFs, some of which offer as much as three times the daily returns of various indexes, sectors, and commodities.
Although some Internet and media sources have touted these
products to retail investors, understanding their performance is complicated. First, leverage makes funds far more volatile than the indexes they track. Significant market movements can rapidly wipe out a
highly leveraged ETF investment. In the highly volatile market during
the spring of 2009, for example, shares of the Direxion Daily Financial
370
Bear 3X fund fell eighty-five percent between January and June.
Second, and more important, most leveraged ETFs track market
371
performance and are rebalanced on a daily basis.
Daily compound367

See, e.g., John Prestbo, Behind the Target, MARKETWATCH, July 8, 2009, http://
www.marketwatch.com/story/target-date-funds-need-better-aim?pagenumber=2
(“[T]he potpourri of offerings needs some standardization and benchmarking to be
more transparent to investors.”).
368
Nakoma Mutual Funds, http://www1.nakomafunds.com/portal/nf/Home/
tabid/456/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
369
Direxion Fund Information Overview, http://www.direxionfunds.com/
products.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
370
Daisy Maxey, FINRA Urges Caution on Leveraged Funds, WALL ST. J., June 23,
2009, at C9.
371
Direxion appears to have responded to the concerns addressed in this Section by shifting the investment objective of its leveraged mutual funds to monthly,
rather than daily, returns. See, e.g., Direxion Monthly S&P 500 Bull 2x Fund, http://
www.direxionfunds.com/funds/sp500_bull.html?performance;funds=dxslx (last visited
Apr. 15, 2010) (“As of 9/30/2009, the Bull Fund’s investment objective has changed
from seeking daily investment results, before fees and expenses, of 250% of the price per-
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ing means that, over the long term, leveraged ETFs need not mimic the
performance of the associated index and frequently do not. As the
holding period extends, the returns of the leveraged product will differ
372
increasingly from those predicted by the movement of the index, and
373
may even move in the opposite direction. Academic research demonstrates that these effects are due to the structure of the leveraged products and that, over time, leveraged ETFs (in either direction) will un374
This underperformance will
derperform the benchmark index.
375
increase with the volatility of the underlying index.
376
Faced with litigation claiming inadequate disclosure,
many
funds now provide extensive and specific warnings about their risks
and indicate that they are not appropriate for investors who do not
377
Regulators, including the SEC and FINRA,
understand those risks.

formance of its benchmark to seeking monthly investment results, before fees and expenses, of 200% of the price performance of its benchmark.”). Direxion’s ETFs continue
to reflect an investment objective based on daily returns. Direxion, ETF Information,
http://www.direxionshares.com/etfs (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
372
See, e.g., Tom Lauricella, ETF Math Lesson: Leverage Can Produce Unexpected Returns,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at R1 (explaining how daily compounding produces this result).
373
See, e.g., The Riskiest ETFs on Earth—3X Sector ETF Short/Long, http://
www.darwinsfinance.com/riskiest-etfs-earth-3x-returns/ (May 22, 2009) (citing two examples in which the underlying index, the leveraged ETF, and the leveraged inverse ETF
all lost money over a six-month and a seventeen-month holding period); see also CANADIAN FOUND. FOR ADVANCEMENT OF INVESTOR RIGHTS, HEADS YOU LOSE, TAILS YOU
LOSE: THE STRANGE CASE OF LEVERAGED ETFS 2 (2009), available at http://
faircanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/etfs-may-14pm-etf-sw-final-final1.pdf
(reporting findings that, over a twelve-month study period, four of nine pairs of leveraged
commodity ETFs lost money in both their bull and bear positions).
The Canadian study offers the case of gold-mining stocks as a dramatic example:
The Canadian gold sub-index gained 1% for the 12 months ending March 31,
2009. The HBP S&P/TSX Global Gold Bear Plus ETF did not lose 2%, as its
2X inverse would indicate. It actually lost 87%. Its pair, the inverse Global
Gold Bull Plus ETF, should have gained 2%. Instead, it lost 46%.
Id. at 1.
374

Lei Lu et al., Long Term Performance of Leveraged ETFs 14-15 (August 1,
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344133.
375
Id.
376
See, e.g., Daisy Maxey, ProShare Draws Suit Over a Leveraged ETF, WALL ST. J., Aug.
7, 2009, at C11 (describing litigation alleging that ProShare improperly failed to disclose the risks of its Ultrashort Real Estate ETF, “including the risk of a ‘spectacular
tracking error’”).
377
See, e.g., DIREXION, PROSPECTUS 4-7 (2009), available at http://
www.direxionfunds.com/pdfs/Prospectus_Except_1208.pdf.
Direxion warns that,
among other things, the funds “are very different from most mutual funds,” “are not suitable for all investors,” “should be utilized only by sophisticated investors,” and that “a
Fund could theoretically lose an amount greater than net assets in the event of a move-
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378

have stated that these products are not suitable for all investors.
Some firms have responded by restricting the sale of leveraged
379
ETFs. It remains unclear, however, whether regulators should intervene by requiring more precise labeling and disclosure of product
risks, by banning funds that offer a high degree of volatility or risk, or
at least by precluding unsophisticated retail investors from purchasing
380
them. On the other hand, concern about liability and regulation, in
the absence of explicit regulatory guidance, may lead firms to ban
381
these products despite their utility to some investors.
IV. REFORMING REGULATION
If existing regulation is inadequate, how can it be fixed? Pending
congressional proposals include a number of reforms to the regulation of mutual funds and other retail investments. The Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 contains, within its
ment of its target index in excess of 50% in a direction adverse to the Fund . . . . In short,
the risk of total loss exists.” Id.
378
See, e.g., Ross Kerber, SEC Warns Investors on Leveraged ETF Holdings, REUTERS,
Aug. 18, 2009, http://reuters.com/article/idustre57h64620090818 (describing a joint
warning by the SEC and FINRA). FINRA also imposed increased margin requirements
on leveraged ETFs. See Increased Margin Requirements for Leveraged Exchange-Traded and
Associated Uncovered Options, REG. NOTICE 09-53 (FINRA, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2009,
(effective date Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/
@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p119906.pdf.
379
See Don Dion, Leveraged ETFs: A Call for Coordination, THESTREET.COM, Aug. 10,
2009, http://www.thestreet.com/story/10569383/1/leveraged-etfs-a-call-for-coordination.
html (describing decisions by several firms to restrict the sale of leveraged ETFs).
380
See id. (calling for CFTC, FINRA, and the SEC to join forces in requiring that
traders be identified as sophisticated before being allowed to purchase leveraged
ETFs); Scott Burns, Time for Derivative ETFs to Comply, MORNINGSTAR, June 12, 2009,
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=295136 (arguing that ETFs
that use derivatives should be regulated like derivatives, and investors should be required to get approval before purchasing them). The SEC also imposes wealth/income
and sophistication requirements on purchasers of hedge funds and private equity. See
generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2009) (defining “accredited investor”). The SEC has
also considered tightening these restrictions to prevent the “retailization” of the market for such investments. See, e.g., Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled
Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 8766, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2576, 72 Fed. Reg.
400, 400-03 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007) ( “[M]any individual investors today may be eligible to make investments in privately offered investment pools as accredited investors
that previously may not have qualified as such for those investments.”).
381
See, e.g., Ron DeLegge, Is the Backlash Against Leveraged ETFs Warranted?, ETFGUIDE.COM, July 31, 2009, http://www.etfguide.com/commentary/581/Is-theBacklash-against-Leveraged-Etfs-Warranted? (challenging brokerage firms’ bans of
sales of leveraged ETFs, but criticizing regulators’ failure to regulate these instruments
properly by insisting on appropriate names and disclosure).
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thousand-plus pages, proposed legislation that would create an investor advisory committee, explicitly authorize the SEC to engage in consumer testing, establish a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers, and au382
If
thorize the SEC to pass rules requiring point-of-sale disclosure.
adopted, these reforms will respond to a number of the concerns detailed in this Article. The problem, however, is that these proposals,
like prior reform efforts, represent a reactive and piecemeal approach
that is largely modeled on the existing regulatory structure. More importantly, the reforms do not correct the fundamental deficiencies in
market structure. To a large extent, both the existing and proposed
regulations impede, rather than enhance, market forces by misdirecting investment choice, constraining product variation, and creating
inappropriate incentives for revenue sharing, product manipulation,
and strategic complexity.
This Article proposes an alternative—replacing the ICA with a
conceptually distinct method of regulating retail investment products.
First, this Article proposes a product-based approach to the regulation
of mutual funds, ETFs, and similar consumer-directed investments.
Second, it calls for the creation of a new regulator, the Consumer Investment Regulatory Authority (CIRA), to administer this approach,
with the authority to regulate both intermediated investment products
and the processes by which they are sold.
For products, the Article introduces a new, market-enhancing
regulatory approach: conform or explain. Under this approach, CIRA would collect data and provide information on standardized investment products. Rather than being limited to specific product
structures, as with existing law, product sponsors would be free to innovate and offer alternatives to the standardized products, subject to
the requirement that they explain the ways in which their products
differ from the standards.
With respect to the sales process, this Article rejects the generalized
constraints of the “know your customer” and suitability requirements, as
well as their administration under the opaque oversight of FINRA. Instead, this Article argues for conduct-based regulation of retail sales
practices. In particular, the Article proposes that brokers be required to
document their disclosures to investors about asset allocation, performance, and costs, as well as the justification for advising unsophisticated
retail clients to purchase higher-cost and nonconforming products.
382

Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. §§ 7101–04 (2009).
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A. Product Regulation—Conform or Explain
As Part III has shown, the corporate governance components and
the disclosure requirements of the existing regime are flawed. Even
well-intentioned independent directors lack the tools to provide a
meaningful evaluation of the fairness of transactions involving conflicts of interest—from soft dollars to management fees—and the application of fiduciary principles through litigation burdens directors
who act properly and is unlikely to constrain directors who do not. At
best, fiduciary principles drive directors toward documenting their
processes and deliberations more carefully but offer little counterweight to the market incentives operating upon the investment advisor. Shareholder voting provides limited value to shareholders who
383
have the option of ready exit at NAV, and the procedural adjustments that would be required to make shareholder voting meaningful
cannot be justified in terms of their costs.
At the same time, there is evidence of substantial failures in the
market for mutual funds. Existing disclosure requirements operate imperfectly, in part due to differences between the traditional capital
markets and the market for mutual funds. Market checks, such as pricing, arbitrage, and the market for corporate control, do not operate on
mutual funds. To eliminate wasteful governance mechanisms, the regulatory structure must be strengthened to improve market discipline.
The solution is a shift in focus. Mutual funds and comparable alternatives should be regulated as products, not investments. In particular, the approach of the ICA, which compels investment companies to be organized as distinct legal entities subject to designated
corporate governance and which characterizes funds as clients subject
to the fiduciary protection of the Investment Advisers Act, should be
eliminated. Regulation should instead treat those investments as consumer products and treat fund advisors as the producers of such
384
products.

383

See, e.g., John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Exit, Voice, and Fee Liability in Mutual Funds,
120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1547162) (arguing that the ability of shareholders to exit for cash virtually eliminates shareholders’ incentives to impose accountability through director elections or
fee litigation).
384
Other commentators have, in general terms, endorsed this approach. See, e.g.,
Harvey L. Pitt, Over-Lawyered at the SEC, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2006, at A15 (faulting “the
60-year-old legislation the SEC administers” for “treat[ing] mutual funds as companies
when the economic reality is that they are products”).
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In theory, product regulation can take various forms. Regulators
can ban products that are unduly complex or risky. The FDA bans a
385
Regulators can limit product sales
variety of products on this basis.
to qualified purchasers, as the SEC does with hedge fund investments,
or require that an intermediary operate as a gatekeeper who controls
access to risky products, as the FDA does with prescription pharmaceuticals. A regulator can also require a product to meet certain specifications or to have particular characteristics that are designed to make
it safe for consumers. One variation of this approach is to mandate
standardization, as reflected in proposals to require certain types of
“plain vanilla” consumer credit products such as credit cards or residential mortgages. Regulators can also require disclosure of product
dangers, such as the FDA-mandated warnings on cigarette packages.
This Article proposes a different approach to enhance market
function: standardization as a baseline to structure and simplify disclosure. Rather than relying on regulators to identify appropriate
products, the proposal relies on investor choice, facilitated by improved transparency. At the same time, the proposal advocates regulatory identification of standardized products to simplify investment
decisions for unsophisticated consumers.
In moving toward product regulation, regulators should reject the
analogy to common stock. Investors are not attempting to determine
the going concern value of productive assets when they evaluate mutual funds or ETFs. Returns from a mutual fund will not, for the average mutual fund shareholder, be based on managerial talent—and
even if they are, investors are unlikely to be able to select for this. Accordingly, investors should be actively discouraged, through disclosure
regulation, from focusing on historical performance data or managerial expertise.
Instead, returns will be based on the structure of the product. Investors need, and should receive, disclosure of investment strategy, including asset allocation, leverage, and diversification, as well as the
costs associated with this strategy. Investors should receive specific da385

See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Threatens to Ban Caffeinated Alcoholic Drinks, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A11 (describing the FDA’s announcement that it would ban
caffeinated alcoholic beverages unless manufacturers proved they were safe). Regulatory error can result in the banning of useful products. Moreover, a product may be
useful to only a subset of users. Cf. Anup Malani et al., Accounting for Differences Among
Patients in the FDA Approval Process 26 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law &
Econ. Working Paper (2d Series), Working Paper No. 488, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492909 (observing that FDA policy leads it to deny “approval for drugs that benefit some patients, but not the average patient”).
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ta on the extent to which these factors represent committed product
characteristics or may be modified at management’s discretion. Most
importantly, investors need this information on a comparative basis.
Conform or explain, the key component of this Article’s proposed
approach, centers on this need for comparative information. In selecting among close to 10,000 competing products, investors with limited time and sophistication need more than information in a standardized form—they need standardized reference points. No retail
investor can compare 10,000 products along multiple dimensions. Instead, regulators should provide investors with guidance about standardized products and their features, and identify the most important
386
Regulation should, in efdimensions across which products differ.
fect, provide the framework for rational investor choice.
Conform or explain would require CIRA to collect data on existing retail investment products and, using this data, to construct a
menu of standardized, or “plain vanilla,” products involving mainstream investment options and simple product structures. These
standardized options might include an S&P 500 index fund, an actively managed domestic small-cap fund, a long-term bond fund, and so
387
forth.
The regulator would specify certain features of these products to maximize simplicity, such as the absence of loads or 12b-1 fees,
and an investment strategy that did not employ leverage or the use of
derivatives. The regulator would publish benchmark numbers or
ranges for typical product features such as asset allocation, average
expense ratio, turnover rates, and returns.
Conform or explain would then provide a mechanism for structuring market-based disclosure. Unlike substantive regulation, conform or explain would not limit product features or require firms to
offer plain vanilla products. Instead, sponsors would have two alternatives. If they chose to conform their product to the specifications of the
386

Standardized products limit information costs by reducing investors’ choices to a
more limited menu of options. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 38-42
(2000) (arguing that standardization can reduce the information and transaction costs
that excessive individual tailoring causes). Because the optimal degree of standardization
in the mutual fund market is unknown, and because of the risk of regulatory effort, this
Article does not propose any limit on the sale of alternatives to the standardized products.
387
The Morningstar mutual fund categories might provide an initial list of products, and CIRA could then identify qualifying characteristics. See Wells Fargo, supra
note 352 (describing mutual fund categories). Some existing products would likely
qualify under CIRA’s criteria. See CHRISTINE BENZ, MORNINGSTAR GUIDE TO MUTUAL
FUNDS: FIVE-STAR STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS 103 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining that some
fund families, such as Putnam and T. Rowe Price, offer “style-pure” funds).
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plain vanilla product, they could simply disclose the relevant product
category with no additional point-of-purchase disclosure required. Investors could rely on the product category without the need to determine whether the product had unanticipated characteristics or features.
The second alternative would be for sponsors to explain their
products’ distinguishing features. Sponsors would be unrestricted as
to product form and structure as long as they explained the relevant
differences. Disclosure requirements for nonconforming products
would require sponsors to provide the published information on the
most closely analogous standardized product, as well as an explanation of each feature in which the offered product varied from the
388
For example, an actively managed large-cap equity fund
standard.
that held fewer securities than the standard product, employed strategies that included the use of futures and options, and had a higher
expense ratio would have to identify and explain each of these features. Finally, sponsors would be free to modify characteristics of investment products on an ongoing basis, but any material modification
would require notice to shareholders—akin to the 8-K notifications of
389
material events provided by operating companies. Thus, shareholders would receive an affirmative warning if a fund shifted its style or
390
asset allocation, as the Magellan fund did.
Conform or explain would have several advantages over the current disclosure system. As indicated above, the disclosure would focus
on information important to a rational shareholder decision and
would structure that information in a way that facilitates consumer
choice. Commentators have repeatedly urged the SEC to mandate the
disclosure of comparative information for investors, arguing that investors cannot evaluate information on fees, returns, and risks without
391
understanding how the fund compares to similar funds. Important388

Regulations would provide a list of relevant features, which would include expenses, asset allocation, leverage, derivatives, short selling, and discretion to alter the
fund’s investment strategy.
389
A reporting company must file an 8-K within two days after the occurrence of
specified material events. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2009); SEC, Current Report (Form
8-K), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.
390
Because shareholders can exit mutual funds at NAV, notice of modifications is
sufficient protection; requiring shareholders to approve such changes is unnecessary.
391
See, e.g., Letter from David Certner, Legislative Counsel and Dir. of Legislative
Policy, AARP, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-114.pdf (stating that the SEC should
require comparative information because, “absent this kind of comparative information, it is difficult to know whether fees and expenses, for example, are reasonable for
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ly, conform or explain would structure comparative information in a
way that would render it useful. In contrast, under existing regulation,
funds may provide comparative information to a wholly dissimilar
392
product or benchmark, rendering the comparison highly misleading.
Comparative information facilitates investor choice because it is
consistent with consumer decisionmaking strategies in other contexts.
Although the literature on this subject is extensive, a few principles
stand out. First, consumer evaluations are largely comparative in na393
ture. Rather than assessing a product option in absolute terms, consumers weigh the product against various alternatives along one or
394
Second, in making complex choices,
more preference dimensions.
consumers often act with bounded rationality, limiting the dimensions
395
Third, consumers
along which they compare competing products.
tend to be heavily influenced by the information presented to them,
making their preferences both context-dependent and subject to ma396
nipulation.
These principles suggest that the retail investor is likely to compare product alternatives along the dimensions that the funds present
for comparison. If mutual funds present performance data, the consumer will attempt to choose the best performing fund. If funds
the fund in question”); Letter from Mercer Bullard, Founder and President of Fund
Democracy, et al., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 8 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-108.pdf [hereinafter Bullard Comment Letter] (“Nothing would promote comparison shopping and competition in the
fund industry more than a mandatory fee comparison in the fund fee table.”).
392
See, e.g., Bullard Comment Letter, supra note 391 (observing that the SEC allows Internet funds to use the S&P 500 as a benchmark for performance); Letter from
Joseph A. Franco, Professor, Suffolk Univ. Law School, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC
2 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-113.pdf
(observing that the Janus website compared the Contrarian Fund to the S&P 500 Index, despite the fact that forty-four percent of the Contrarian Fund’s holdings were
foreign securities and forty-eight percent were small-cap stocks).
393
See, e.g., Ravi Dhar et al., Trying Hard or Hardly Trying: An Analysis of Context Effects in Choice, 9 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 189, 192-93 (2000) (suggesting that bias in consumer choice results from consumers making too many comparisons).
394
See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson, Context-Dependent Preferences, 39
MGMT. SCI. 1179, 1182 (1993) (explaining how the presentation of alternative choices
can alter consumer preferences).
395
See, e.g., James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J.
CONSUMER RES. 187, 187 (1998) (describing bounded consumer rationality).
396
See, e.g., Mukesh Bhargava et al., Explaining Context Effects on Choice Using a Model
of Comparative Judgment, 9 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 167, 168-69 (2000) (explaining that
consumers may lack stable preferences when they have limited information and consequently construct preferences by comparing attributes of available alternatives);
Dhar et al., supra note 393, at 190 (exploring why consumers focus on “the comparative aspects of the choice alternatives”).
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present data on expenses, the consumer will focus on expenses. If
397
funds emphasize risk, the consumer will evaluate that characteristic.
The studies suggest that the presentation of information is critical to
398
consumer choice among investment alternatives.
This literature readily explains why investors rely so heavily on
performance data—fund disclosures tell them to. The funds’ mandated disclosure documents and marketing materials present perfor399
mance as the single most important fund characteristic. The trend
toward greater sensitivity to mutual fund expenses is also unsurpris400
ing; recent regulatory changes have increased the detail and visibility of expenses in mandated fund disclosure. The importance of presentation highlights the significance of the SEC’s decisions to limit the
requirement that funds disclose trading costs. Even if investors can
ascertain such costs by researching funds’ additional disclosure documents, consumer evidence suggests that fund purchasers will be un-

397

Commentators have suggested that the SEC affirmatively mandate standardized
disclosure of mutual fund risks. See, e.g., Press Release, BARRA Inc., BARRA Offers
SEC Recommendations on Standard Mutual Fund Risk Disclosure (Sept. 11, 1995),
available at LEXIS, BWIRE file (describing a proposal that the SEC adopt a fund’s
standard deviation as the measure of fund risk). Some private service providers, such
as Morningstar, offer risk ratings. See, e.g., Morningstar.com, Fidelity Magellan Report,
http://quicktake.morningstar.com/FundNet/RatingsAndRisk.aspx?symbol=FMAGX&
country=USA (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (providing standard deviation, sharpe ratio,
beta, Morningstar risk rating, and other numbers for Magellan Fund). Problematically, however, mutual fund risk can be measured in a number of ways. See, e.g., Brenda
Buttner, Which Mutual Fund Risk Measures Really Matter, THESTREET.COM, July 20, 1998,
http://www.thestreet.com/story/31848/which-mutual-fund-risk-measures-reallymatter.html (detailing five ways of quantifying mutual fund risk). In addition, it is unclear whether standard finance measures of risk capture the dominant concerns of retail investors. See, e.g., Paul Schott Stevens & Amy Lancellotta, Improving Mutual Fund
Risk Disclosure, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. PERSP., Nov. 1995, at 1, 2, available at
http://www.idc.org/pdf/per01-02.pdf (opposing a proposal that the SEC mandate a
single standardized numerical risk measurement because the proposal “ignores that
risk is multifaceted, necessarily having different meanings for different investors”).
Moreover, efforts to quantify risk can be misleading. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Opinion,
The 1% Panic, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2008, at A17 (discussing shortcomings of the VaR
(value at risk) model). Accordingly, this Article proposes increased comparative disclosure, rather than an effort to quantify risk precisely.
398
See, e.g., James R. Bettman et al., supra note 395, at 202 (“The organization of
information displays can have a major impact on consumer choices.”).
399
See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES FOR MUTUAL
FUND INFORMATION 3 (2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_06_inv_
prefs_full.pdf (reporting survey results indicating that sixty-nine percent of investors
reviewed historical performance prior to purchase).
400
Id. at 3 (reporting that seventy-four percent of investors reviewed fund fees and
expenses prior to purchase).
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likely to undertake such research or to make the conversions neces401
sary to integrate those costs into the funds’ expense ratios.
Standardization would have the benefit of reducing the number
of options by enabling investors to group product alternatives in a
402
meaningful way based on the standard categories. It would also reduce the dimensions along which investors compare competing products to a manageable number and focus investors on those dimensions
403
Finally, for those investors without suffithat are most important.
cient interest or sophistication to evaluate fund-specific differences,
standardization would allow them to choose a mainstream product
and avoid being misled into selecting a product with above-average
costs or risks.
In contrast to alternative regulatory approaches, conform or explain permits market competition to operate as a check on regulatory
error. If a regulator incorrectly identifies certain features as nonstandard, a review of fund disclosures will identify the error. Unlike the
current system, funds will have the opportunity to demonstrate to the
market the value of alternative structures and features, such as incentive-based compensation for fund advisors. Finally, because regulators
will proactively evaluate existing products and their disclosures, they
should be in a position to detect features of new products that should
be disclosed, such as the glide paths of target date funds and the daily
compounding of leveraged ETFs.
Perhaps most important, product regulation would reduce the
need to apply fiduciary principles to fund operations. Viewing fund
shares as products weakens the conception of a fund as a discrete legal
entity that is entitled to invoke fiduciary principles. Instead, the advisor
is offering an investment product for sale. Like any product, the fund
must be advertised accurately and be free from design defects. But
producers do not owe fiduciary obligations to their products. Similarly,
regulatory oversight over many affiliated transactions that current law
heavily restricts would be reduced because the transactions would not
401

See Bettman et al., supra note 395, at 202 (describing the “concreteness” principle, according to which decisionmakers “will use only that information that is explicitly displayed and will use it in the form it is displayed, without transforming it”).
402
See Dhar et al., supra note 393, at 199 (highlighting the importance of product
categories in influencing consumer choice).
403
Commentators have suggested a similar approach in the home mortgage context. See MICHAEL BARR ET AL., NEW AM. FOUND., BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED FINANCIAL
SERVICES REGULATION 10 (2008) (arguing that offering a standardized default option
would help anchor the consumer, as well as provide some expectations regarding the
factors relevant to the choice of product).
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involve conflicts of interest. Although some practices might be suffi404
ciently problematic to require regulation, the primary check on conflicts that make a product less attractive would be market competition.
This Article’s proposal has particular implications for excessive fee
405
cases like Jones v. Harris Associates.
Improved transparency with respect to products and selling processes would enhance market discipline and eliminate the need for post hoc judicial review under a prob406
Although there is no guarantee that
lematic fiduciary standard.
average fees would decrease under this proposal—indeed, they might
well increase in the presence of more informative disclosure—a functional market would justify a court’s reliance, as Judge Easterbrook
407
suggested in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Jones.
B. Intermediary Regulation
Conform or explain also offers a template for a conduct-based approach to the regulation of brokers, financial advisors, 401(k) plan
sponsors, and other intermediaries. Existing law takes two approaches, neither of which is satisfactory. On the one hand, courts have generally held that brokers do not act as fiduciaries when they make investment recommendations to customers, leaving their conduct to the
408
limited constraints of the SRO rules. On the other hand, directors,
investment advisors, and 401(k) plan sponsors are all subject to fiduciary duties. Those duties are then subject to uncertain and inconsistent judicial enforcement, which creates the prospect of liability exposure without predictable standards of conduct.
404

It is unclear whether some of the practices currently treated as conflicts could
survive under a meaningful conception of product regulation. If, for example, an ETF
represents an ownership share of a pool of securities, it is difficult to see how interest
earned on lending those securities could belong to anyone other than the owners of
ETF shares. An investment advisor’s retention of such interest would not be a “conflict
of interest;” it would be stealing. See, e.g., John Jannarone, Getting a Fair Share from ETFs,
WALL. ST. J., Jan. 8, 2010, at C10 (stating that iShares kept fifty percent of the stock lending fees its Dow Jones US Financial ETF earned). Many of these transactions, which
fund boards of directors currently oversee, could be monitored by compliance officers.
405
No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/
09pdf/08-586.pdf.
406
See M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 10-13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499410 (arguing that the
Gartenberg standard, at issue in Jones, creates the risk of costly and inefficient litigation).
407
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are skeptical
about Gartenberg because it relies too little on markets.”).
408
See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text (identifying difficulties with private enforcement of SRO rules).
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In lieu of either approach, this Article proposes that intermediary
regulation focus on sales practices. The starting point should be the
409
Intermediaries would be remandated disclosure described above.
quired either to recommend or choose a standardized product for
their clients or to make an informed determination that an alternative
product is superior. Intermediaries—including brokers and employers sponsoring 401(k) plans—would be required to evaluate their
clients’ needs, understand the distinctive components of nonstandardized products, and make an informed decision. Compliance with
these obligations would require explicit consideration of the distinguishing features of the nonstandard product but would not require
the intermediary to demonstrate the superiority of its chosen product,
either ex ante or ex post; it would be sufficient for the intermediary to
determine that the product was a reasonable choice.
Point-of-sale disclosure to investors would include the same explanatory information. The intermediary would be required to disclose a
product’s nonconforming attributes and to document the rationale
for recommending the product. In addition, the intermediary would
be required to disclose the existence and amount of any revenue sharing or other incentives associated with the product.
To provide meaningful accountability, these requirements would be
enforceable both by CIRA and through an explicit private right of ac410
tion. To minimize the cost of liability exposure, however, intermediaries that demonstrate procedural compliance, an informed process, and
the absence of undisclosed conflicts of interest would be protected by a
statutory safe harbor permitting prediscovery dismissal of any litigation,
including litigation alleging fraud or breach of fiduciary duty.
C. The Consumer Investment Regulatory Authority
The final component of conform or explain is the creation of a
new agency, the Consumer Investment Regulatory Authority (CIRA).
Like the SEC and the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA)
411
currently under congressional consideration, CIRA would be struc409
410

See supra Section IV.A. (explaining the disclosure element of conform or explain).
Consideration of the details of this cause of action is beyond the scope of this

Article.
411

As currently proposed, the CFPA would not exercise jurisdiction over mutual
funds or retirement accounts but would focus its attention on credit cards, mortgages,
and similar products. See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R.
3126, 111th Cong. § 101(8) (2009) (proposing the creation of a Consumer Financial
Protection Agency).
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412

tured as an administrative or independent agency and would be
charged with the regulation of retail investment products, including
413
mutual funds, money market funds, and ETFs, whether purchased
directly or through employer-sponsored retirement accounts. CIRA
would also have the authority to regulate intermediaries, including
brokers, financial advisors, and 401(k) plan sponsors with respect to
retail transactions involving these products. Pursuant to this charge,
CIRA would be vested with rulemaking authority, enforcement power,
and the resources to collect information about the market.
The preceding two Sections partially described CIRA’s responsibilities. Understanding the retail investment market is critical to these responsibilities. CIRA should not have to rely on studies conducted by
outside researchers and organizations, but should engage in ongoing
414
internal data collection and analysis. In carrying out these responsibilities, CIRA should be structured and staffed to facilitate product research and to analyze consumer decisionmaking. Accordingly, CIRA
personnel should not be limited to lawyers but should include economists who can analyze the data CIRA collects on existing market products and provide insight into the factors that influence performance
and risk. CIRA should also employ experts in consumer behavior who
can study, on an ongoing basis, the effect of the disclosure mandates
on consumer choice.
Concededly, political barriers may render the creation of a new
415
agency difficult.
In principle, the SEC could implement and administer the regulatory structure detailed in this Article. The SEC has
416
CIlong been understood as the champion of investor protection.

412

Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
98-99 (2008) (advocating reliance on an administrative agency rather than targeted
legislation or ex post judicial intervention).
413
Although CIRA would have jurisdiction over retail investment products, jurisdiction need not be limited to those products discussed in this Article. Indeed, the
regulatory model this Article proposes could readily be extended to broaden retail investor access to pooled investment products, such as hedge funds and private equity
funds, that have traditionally been restricted to accredited investors.
414
CIRA would be able to conduct studies and collect data without incurring the
claims of industry bias that are sometimes raised against organizations like FINRA and
the Investment Company Institute. Notably, under the existing regulatory structure,
industry organizations are virtually the only sources of information about the market
and existing products.
415
See, e.g., Damian Paletta, Consumer-Protection Agency in Doubt, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,
2010, at A4 (identifying political opposition to the creation of a stand-alone agency).
416
See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Commonwealth Club
(May 17, 1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1996/
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RA’s mission, as described herein, is sufficiently extensive to warrant
separate regulatory authority, however, and a new regulatory approach may be most effective when administered by an agency that is
not invested in the old regulatory apparatus. Moreover, there are additional justifications for establishing a new regulator.
First, CIRA’s creation would signal the importance of retail investor protection as a regulatory priority. Commentators have criticized
the existing regulatory agencies for focusing on other priorities and
paying insufficient attention to consumer needs. Although existing
reform proposals seek to address consumer injuries with respect to
mortgage and credit card products, nothing on the table is designed
to restore consumer confidence in the capital markets or to deal with
417
the forward-going need for consumers to act as effective investors.
Second, CIRA’s creation would recognize and legitimate the split
between capital market regulation and retail investor protection. The
“deretailization” of the capital markets and the explosion of institutiononly products and markets highlight a dichotomy between two regula418
tory goals: market protection and retail investor protection.
The financial crisis has demonstrated that market protection is a critically important regulatory objective, and the SEC’s existing regulatory regime is
well suited to obtaining the information necessary to inform debt and
equity prices; yet, as this Article has demonstrated, the methodologies
for protecting the traditional capital markets may not address the spe419
cialized needs of retail purchasers of intermediated products.
Third, CIRA would centralize authority for retail investor protection. Existing regulatory authority over mutual funds, ETFs, and retirement accounts is split among the SEC, the CFTC, the Department
of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), and
spch101.txt (“For the last 62 years, the protection of investors has been the primary
goal of the Commission.”).
417
Proposals to privatize social security would dramatically increase this need. See
generally Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Privatizing Social Security: Administration and Implementation, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1325 (2001) (exploring the administrative implications of privatization proposal trade-offs between limiting risk and facilitating individual control).
418
See Cartwright, supra note 7 (describing the growth of institution-only markets
and asset classes that do not involve disclosure or regulatory oversight other than antifraud remedies).
419
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV.
785, 819 (2009) (“Many of the SEC’s most glaring deficiencies . . . have centered on
intermediary oversight.”); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1081 (2009) (“The SEC is the
retail investor’s champion only in a bounded way.”).
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FINRA. A single regulator would clarify regulatory responsibility and
prevent the Department of Labor from relying on the SEC to regulate
401(k) disclosure or the SEC from relying on FINRA to monitor bro420
Centralizing regulatory authority would
ker-dealer sales practices.
limit efforts to structure products for the purpose of evading regulation—so-called regulatory arbitrage. By addressing both the product
and the sales practice, a single regulator could identify relationships
between the two, such as the extent to which broker advice benefits
from or counteracts the effects of consumer-directed disclosure. Finally, concentrating authority within a single regulator would allow the
development of expertise with respect to disclosure effectiveness, cognitive biases, and other issues of particular relevance to the protection
of retail investors.
This last point suggests a valuable extension of CIRA beyond the
administration of conform or explain. Regulators and commentators
421
have identified a need for improved investor education, a need that
has expanded as a result of the growth in consumer-directed investment through retirement accounts, education accounts, and elsewhere. Yet retail investors today demonstrate investment behaviors
that, even in the face of the best products, limit their ability to maximize their returns, including poor asset allocation, misguided efforts at
market timing, performance chasing, and herding. Early evidence
suggests, in particular, that retail investors will suffer disproportionately from the market turmoil of the last few years because of the poor
422
timing of their investment decisions. An agency that developed ex420

The SEC has been repeatedly criticized, most recently in connection with the
Madoff scandal, for delegating regulation of broker-dealers to FINRA. See, e.g., Fisch,
supra note 419, at 800-03 (identifying shortcomings in FINRA’s regulation of brokerdealers and protection of customers); Posting of Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas to
Stockbroker Fraud Blog, http://www.stockbrokerfraudblog.com/2009/09/sec_nasd_
finra_sipc_new_sec_report_card_on_madoff_catastrophy_furhter_reveals_that_investor_
protection_is_severely_flawed.html (Sept. 3, 2009) (describing FINRA as “a non-profit
corporation owned by securities firms, with a charter similar to that of a country club”).
421
See, e.g., Black, supra note 255, at 307 (highlighting the need for retail investors
to receive sufficient education to evaluate their brokers’ recommendations); James A.
Fanto, Comparative Investor Education, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1083, 1084-86 (1998) (calling
for increased attention to investor education in light of developments in how retirement accounts are managed).
422
As the market reached its trough in March 2009, retail investor money was rapidly exiting equity funds. See, e.g., Shell, supra note 14 (reporting that, during the
week ending March 11, 2009, “investors yanked a net $22.1 billion out of stock funds”).
Retail investors remained on the sidelines as the market rebounded during the remainder of 2009. See, e.g., Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Many Small Investors Have Sat Out
Rally, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2009, at A18 (reporting that most small investors stayed out
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pertise in retail investors and their investment behavior would be well
positioned to tailor investor education to these problems.
CONCLUSION
Mutual funds and other intermediated retail investment products
offer the potential for consumers to participate in capital market
growth, protect their savings from the effects of inflation, and build a
nest egg for education, retirement, and other financial goals. This potential has led an increasing number of investors—including many of
limited means and sophistication—to purchase such products. It is
time for regulators to respond to these developments through a regulatory approach tailored to the needs of those retail investors.
Although the SEC has endeavored to protect retail investors pursuant to the ICA, an examination of the market for retail investment
products suggests deficiencies in that approach. At the same time, the
regulatory and governance components of the ICA are costly and limit
innovation. This Article has argued that an alternative approach
premised on giving investors the choice of standardized financial
products or comparative disclosure of product differences could reduce compliance costs and protect investors.
Conform or explain couples increased transparency, through the
promulgation of standardized products, with a set of objective and
predictable sales practices that would enhance consumer protection
while limiting excessive liability exposure. Conform or explain
enables providers of retail investment products to innovate and to differentiate their products from those of competitors with the assurance
that market forces can adequately evaluate such innovations. Finally,
conform or explain provides a template for CIRA, a new agency, to
structure regulation and to develop expertise in the retail market that
can facilitate future developments in investor education.
It is difficult to predict the effect this proposal would have on existing products and fee structures. Conform or explain may dramatically
reduce the number of retail investment products as improved disclosure unmasks limited product differences and strategic complexity. Alternatively, new products and product structures may emerge as fund

of the market as it rose 53% between March and October 2009). Subsequently, after
the market recouped much of what it had lost, retail money began to flow back into
the market. See, e.g., Jeff Cox, Are Average Investors Getting Too Optimistic About Stocks?,
CNBC.COM, Jan. 4, 2010, http://www.cnbc.com/id/34688573 (reporting that retail
investment into equity funds “soared” in the week ending December 22, 2009).
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sponsors are freed from existing regulatory constraints on leverage,
compensation structure, liquidity, and concentration. The critical
component of the proposal is that it does not depend on regulatory
omniscience to determine which products are suitable for investors but
instead unleashes market forces to make these choices.

